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ABSTRACT
In recent years, an increasing number of Chinese scholars of law and politics have found
inspiration in the works of the influential conservative German legal and political theorist Carl
Schmitt (1888-1985). Embodying a larger shift away from orthodox debates framed on the
opposition of state Marxism and Anglo-American liberalism, Schmitt’s views have broadened
the scope of discourse on issues such as the Communist Party’s role in governance, judicial
constitutionalism, economic systems, and China’s place in international order. This article assesses
Schmitt’s role in current debates as part of a longer history of engagements that began during the
Nanjing Decade (1927-1937), but was interrupted due to Schmitt’s persona non grata status
during the Cold War. For the first time putting recent discourse in the context of earlier (now
obscure) receptions by Chinese intellectuals, the article shows that Schmitt’s thought has long
provided a conceptual vocabulary useful for reframing matters of public law and political economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt (18881985) is widely regarded as one of the most incisive modern critics of
liberalism. Considered by some as the “Hobbes of the 20th century,”1
his thoughts continue to generate new applications and responses
worldwide, particularly when fundamental tenets of mainstream liberal
thought, such as representative government, universal human rights,
judicial review, or the rule of law, are called into question. As a
historical personality, Schmitt’s reputation has long been tarnished by
his opportunistic embrace of, and legal contributions to, the Nazi
regime that took power in Germany after 1933 (and in which his
internal enemies successfully marginalized his political influence by
1936).2 However, his theoretical work remains highly influential across
a wide variety of scholarly disciplines, despite the opposition which it
often generates due to these associations. Now, just as during his life,
even those who fundamentally disagree with Schmitt’s concepts and
premises often find themselves compelled to engage with them.
Moreover, while Schmitt’s views were for the most part
developed as an internal critique of Western modernity steeped in his
own political, legal, and social context, he has also had a strikingly large
and growing impact in intellectual discourse beyond Western Europe
and North America.3 In relation to topics such as the nature of politics,
sovereignty and international law, the function of executive power, et
1
See, e.g., HELMUT SCHELSKY, THOMAS HOBBES: EINE POLITISCHE LEHRE
[THOMAS HOBBES: A POLITICAL DOCTRINE] 5 (1981); CARL SCHMITT, THE
LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING AND FAILURE
OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL, back cover (G. Schwab trans., 2006) (1938).
2
See REINHARD MEHRING, CARL SCHMITT: A BIOGRAPHY, 346–48 (2009).
3
See, e.g. Shiyake Masanori, Zur Lage der Carl Schmitt-Forschung in Japan [On the
State of Carl Schmitt Research in Japan] in COMPLEXIO OPPOSITORUM: ÜBER CARL
SCHMITT 491–502 (Helmut Quaritsch ed., 1988); Bongkun Kal, Carl Schmitts Einfluß
auf das koreanische Verfassungsleben [Carl Schmitt’s Influence on the Life of the Korean
Constitution] in id. at 503–07; Vamireh Chacon, Die Rezeption Carl Schmitts in Brasilien
[Carl Schmitt’s Reception in Brazil] in SCHMITTIANA V: BEITRÄGE ZU LEBEN UND
WERK CARL SCHMITTS 305-313 (Piet Tommissen ed., 1996); Maria Engström,
Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy, 35 CONTEMP. SECURITY
POL’Y 356, 356–79 (2014); Stefan Auer, Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis
and the Return of Geopolitics, 91 INT’L AFF. 5, 953, 953–68 (2015).

183

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:1

al., Schmitt’s critiques of liberal universalism have ironically sparked an
ever more universal interest.
The phenomenon of “Schmitt in China” has recently drawn
increased attention among Western scholars.4 Meanwhile Chinese
intellectuals themselves have been discussing, with varying opinions, a
“Schmitt Fever” among their colleagues since at latest 2006. 5 Since the
turn of the 21st century, it has become widely recognized that Schmitt
has a special appeal for Chinese intellectual audiences. Cursory
searches of major Chinese academic databases turn up hundreds of
new articles per year that mention Schmitt by name, as well as others
that clearly display his influences, for example, via discussion of
concepts such as “political theology” (Politische Theologie; zhengzhi de
shenxue 政治的神学)6 or the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand;
For helpful background regarding some legal and political factors
associated with the most recent wave of attention to Schmitt in China, see Flora Sapio,
Carl Schmitt in China, THE CHINA STORY
(Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.thechinastory.org/2015/10/carl-schmitt-in-china/; Charlotte Kroll,
Reading the Temperature Curve: Sinophone Schmitt-fever in Context and Perspective in CARL
SCHMITT AND LEO STRAUSS IN THE CHINESE-SPEAKING WORLD: REORIENTING
THE POLITICAL, 103–19 (Kai Marchal and Carl K.Y. Shaw eds., 2017); Sebastian Veg,
The Rise of China’s Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and ‘Repoliticization’, 82 CHINA J.
24, 2345– (2019).
5
See especially the April 2006 issue of the Hong Kong-based journal
Twenty-First Century (Ershiyi Shiji 二十一世紀), which opens with a section
comprised of four articles “Discussing ‘Schmitt Fever in China’” (Lun “Shimite Re”
zai Zhongguo 论「施米特热」在中国). The phrase “Schmitt Fever” (Shimite Re 施
米特) is a variant of a standard expression used to describe academic trends, e.g.
“Weber Fever” (Weibo Re 韦伯热). In fact, “Schmitt Fever” had already been
discussed by Chinese scholars as early as 2000, but this was primarily in reference to
the upsurge in interest in Schmitt studies in the West. 孙伟 [Sun Wei], “施密特”
敌友政治观”的三种诠释 [Three Interpretations of Schmitt’s ‘Friend–Enemy Definition of
the Political’], 5 青海师范大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [J. QINGHAI NORMAL U.
(PHIL. AND SOC. SCI. ED.)], [page numbers] (2000) (“[A]lthough Carl Schmitt is
known to very few people in China, the ‘Schmitt Fever’ in the West is flourishing”);
曹卫东 [Cao Weidong], 领袖与思想家 [Leaders and Thinkers], 3 读书 [DUSHU] 114–
24 (2001); 刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施密特与政治哲学的现代性 [Schmitt and the
Modernity of Political Philosophy], 浙江学刊 [ZHEJIANG ACADEMIC J.] [page numbers]
(2001) (noting that “[Jürgen] Habermas has reacted to the ‘Schmitt fever’ of the
English-speaking world with profound alarm[.]”).
6
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 2010) (1922).
4
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liwai zhuangtai 例外状态).7 As in the West, these references span a
number of fields from law and politics to philosophy, comparative
literature, history, and other subjects in the humanities.
Much in-depth engagement with Schmitt in the areas of
political and legal theory has often tended to reflect views emphasizing
the paramount importance of state and Party authority (albeit diverging
in how that authority is more concretely defined).8 At the same time,
however, many discussions of Schmitt’s ideas are less directly
polemical, instead simply conducting legal analysis or comparative
political studies via the prism of his ideas, for example, his conception
of sovereignty as the power to decide upon the state of exception.9
Even some scholars calling for democratic reforms or a reduction in
Party interventionism have made use of his ideas in seeking to develop
their proposals while avoiding stereotyping as imitators of Western
norms.10
Moreover, Schmitt’s later international thought, as opposed to
his earlier constitutional law writings, is not easily confined to
ideological classifications oriented around dichotomies between
liberalism and statism or authoritarianism. His writings on the origins
of “Europe” as a political-spatial entity have stimulated critical
scholarship on colonial and imperial legal history. These writings are
now also finding keen readers among intellectuals who see in China’s
rise a possible new “spatial revolution” of the world.11 Given these
emerging readings, it is possible that Schmitt’s greatest impact in China
could ultimately lie less in domestic affairs than those concerning the

Id. at 1.
See section IV.A. infra.
9
Id.
10
See QI ZHENG, CARL SCHMITT, MAO ZEDONG AND THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION (2015) (arguing that Schmitt’s thought is best interpreted as
problematizing how an “exceptional” polity can transition into a state of order and
normality, implicitly defined as a significant reduction in the Party’s direct political
control over the legal organs of the state).
11
Cf. Carl Schmitt, Die Raumrevolution: Durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen
Frieden [Spatial Revolution: Through Total War to Total Peace] in STAAT, GROßRAUM,
NOMOS: ARBEITEN AUS DEN JAHREN 1916-1969 (Günter Maschke ed., 1995) (1940).
7
8
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organization of Asia’s “great space” (Großraum; Da Kongjian 大空间) or
the global spatial order (Raumordnung; Kongjian Zhixu 空间秩序).12
Of course, it will only become clear in retrospect which of the
diverse Chinese readings of Schmitt leaves the most significant legacy.
However, a more nuanced understanding of his impact in China today
might be gained by paying attention to the broad variety of
engagements with Schmitt’s thought, as well as by examining the
historical context of his Chinese receptions. As this article will show,
Schmitt has had notable Chinese readers and a role (if until around
2000 usually only a very minor one) in Chinese arguments on law and
politics since 1929 at the latest. Even as he was developing his ideas
during the Weimar and Nazi periods, some leading intellectuals were
engaging with these ideas and translating them into the Chinese
context—with their own elaboration and questioning. While it would
be a mistake to attribute much influence to Schmitt during most of the
twentieth century (especially given that his work was primarily known
only within narrow academic circles) his previous receptions may
nonetheless help to illuminate debates that have emerged since the
beginning of “Schmitt Fever” in the early 2000s.
The first section below will examine the occasional
engagements with Schmitt’s theory of leading intellectuals during the
Republic of China’s so-called “Nanjing Decade” (1927-1937). The
second section will examine how more marginal—but still
influential—intellectual currents, including members of China’s 1930s
fascist movement and pro-Japanese wartime collaborators, at times
found support for their views in Schmitt’s work. The third section will
address the subsidence of interest in Schmitt in the postwar period in
both the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and under the Republic
of China (“ROC”) regime on Taiwan, until his resurgence on both
sides of the Strait in discussions of the 1980s-1990s. Finally, the last
12
See 方旭 [Fang Xu], 以大空间秩序告别普世帝国 [Saying Farewell to
Universal Empire with a Großraum Order], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 4 (2018); 刘小枫
[Liu Xiaofeng], 欧洲文明的”自由空间”与现代中国——读施米特《大地的
法》劄记 [European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China: A Reading of Carl
Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde], 1 中国政治学 [CHINESE POLITOLOGY] 2 (2018). These
and other related readings of Schmitt’s international thought are the subject of
section IV.C. infra.
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section will review key features of Schmitt’s role in PRC discourse over
the past two decades, first in domestic debates on law and political
economy, and, most recently, in relation to international law and
geopolitics.
II. EARLY ENGAGEMENT AND CRITIQUE
A. Germany, China, and the Life of States
In a diary entry dated July 19, 1931, Carl Schmitt refers to a
visit by “a Chinese [student] that [Rudolf] Smend graduated . . .
Dauling Hsü; a handsome, clever, and likable man.”13 This student,
now often referred to via the standard Pinyin romanization of his
Chinese name, Xu Daolin 徐道邻 (1907-1973),14 was both one of the
earliest Chinese public intellectuals to engage with Schmitt’s thought
and one of those who did so most intensively. Xu’s own unique path
as a member of one of China’s most elite families, as an influential
scholar, and then as a politician (and back again) would give him cause
to reflect on Schmitt’s ideas at various points. For several years after
1932 he was a high-level state official, diplomat, and close associate of
Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1887-1975). After 1949, Xu would head to
Taiwan with his family, before moving to the United States for the last
chapter of his life.15

13
CARL SCHMITT, TAGEBÜCHER 1930-1934, 125 (Wolfgang Schuller ed.,
2010) (“um 1 kam der Chinese Dauling Hsü . . . ein schöner, kluger, sympathischer
Mann.”).
14
Xu is also referred to at times by the German-style romanization of his
name that he favored, Hsü Dau-lin, or by the English-style romanization Hsu Taolin, among other variations.
15
See, e.g. entry on Xu Daolin in 何勤华 [HE QINHUA], 中国法学史
[HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES] VOL. 3 706 (2006); 陈新宇 [Chen Xinyu],
先哲已逝,
典范永存——缅怀徐道邻先生兼评《中国法制史论集》[The
Great Sage Has Passed, The Model Is Preserved Forever: Recalling Xu Daolin and Commenting
on his Essays on Chinese Legal History], 4 政法论坛 [TRIB. POL. SC. & L.] 178 (2007).
See also BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF REPUBLICAN CHINA VOL. 2 143–46
(Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard eds., 1968). See also 徐州走出的民国
宪法学先驱 [A Pioneering Legal Scholar of the Republic of China from Xuzhou], 徐州日报
XUZHOU DAILY (Nov. 15, 2014).
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Xu was born as the third son of the warlord Xu Shuzheng 徐
树铮 (1880-1925),16 who was influential in the “Anhui Clique,” a leader
of its political wing, and as a general led the occupation of recently
independent Mongolia in an ultimately failed attempt at reconquest
between 1919-1921. The elder Xu provided his son with an extensive
modern education (including in the German language) by private
tutors, while acting as the right-hand man of the leader of the Northern
Chinese regime, Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865-1936). Duan and the Anhui
Clique suffered several reversals of fortune against their rivals during
the early 1920s, however, and the elder Xu was dispatched on extended
visits to Europe in part due to these factional struggles. Xu Daolin
accompanied his father during several of these trips, and arrived in
Germany with his father in 1924 to pursue higher level studies there.
Upon the latter’s return to China the following year, he was
assassinated upon the orders of the rival warlord Feng Yuxiang 冯玉
祥 (1882-1948).17
Xu thus interrupted his studies to return to China for his
father’s funeral, coming again to Germany in 1926 and studying over
the following years in Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Geneva. 18 In 1928,
he then entered the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin as a
doctoral candidate in law, working with the legal theorist Rudolf
Smend (1882-1975), who was one of Schmitt’s longtime friends and
benefactors.19 The topic of his doctoral thesis was “[The] Rigid and
Flexible Constitution and Constitutional Change” (Starre und biegsame
Verfassung und Verfassungswandlung).20 Eventually, following his

Xu Daolin would later write a collection of his father’s writings with
additional biographical material, in which he also recounts some details of his early
life. 徐樹錚 [XU SHUZHENG], 徐樹錚先生文集年譜合刊 [COLLECTED
WRITINGS, LIFE, AND PUBLICATIONS OF XU SHUZHENG] (徐道麟 [Xu Daolin] and
徐櫻 [Xu Ying] eds., 1962).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 27.
19
Schmitt owed in part one of his own major career advancements, his
appointment to the University of Bonn in 1921, to Smend’s appreciation of his books
Political Romanticism (1919) and Dictatorship (1921). See Mehring, supra note 2, at 105–
16.
20
Hartmut Walravens, Hsü Dau-lin 徐道鄰 (1906–1973) im Briefwechsel mit
Hellmut Wilhelm [Hsü Dau-lin’s Correspondence with Hellmut Wilhelm], NOAG
16
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successful defense of the thesis on August 8, 1931 and receipt of the
Dr. Jur. degree, this project would be published with De Gruyter as
the well-received Die Verfassungswandlung (1932), which to this day is
regularly cited in (particularly German and Latin American)
constitutional scholarship.21
Xu arrived in Berlin at a time when Smend and Schmitt were
particularly engaged with each other’s work.22 The two shared a
commitment to what could be termed existential or subjective forms
of constitutionalism, as opposed to the positivism or legal formalism
associated with figures such as the Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen
(1881-1973).23 However, they differed as to some of the key
characteristics of constitutions and their role in the life of the state. In
Schmitt’s depiction, the constitution of a state was based on the
concrete form of existence of that state’s people, taking into account
both the basic desired structure of its social and cultural way of life and
its inherent distinctiveness from outsiders and alien groups. Because
non-members could in the extreme case always turn into existential
threats, they had to be regarded as potential enemies and as different
in character from the in-group. This binary classification, the “Friend-

(NACHRICHTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FÜR NATUR- UND VÖLKERKUNDE
OSTASIENS) 177–78 (2005).
21
See, e.g. Andreas Voßkuhle, Gibt es und wozu nutzt eine Lehre vom
Verfassungswandel? [Is There a Theory of Constitutional Change and How Is It Useful?], 43
DER STAAT 450–59 (2004); Ana Victoria Sánchez Urrutia, Mutación constitucional y
fuerza normativa de la Constitucíon: una aproximación al origen del concepto [Constitutional
Transformation and the Normative Force of the Constitution: An Approach to the Origins of the
Concept], 20 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 105–35 (2000). Xu
is cited in the above articles as Georg Jellinek’s successor in studying constitutional
change.
22
This is reflected in, for example, the correspondence between the two. See
AUF DER GEFAHRENVOLLEN STRAßE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS:”
BRIEFWECHSEL CARL SCHMITT–RUDOLF SMEND 1921-1961: MIT ERGÄNZENDEN
MATERIALEN [“ON THE DANGER-FILLED ROAD OF PUBLIC LAW”:
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CARL SCHMITT AND RUDOLF SMEND 1921-1961:
WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL] (Reinhard Mehring ed., 2012).
23
For an overview of different major positions on the Weimar Constitution
taken by these and other interlocutors, see, e.g. ARTHUR JACOBSON AND BERNHARD
SCHLINK, WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (2002).
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Enemy” relationship (Freund-Feind Verhältnis), was Schmitt’s famous
definition of the “concept of the political.” 24
Though the “concept of the political” is best known today
from Schmitt’s 1932 book.25 it was first presented in a 1927 journal
article.26 This was in turn followed by Schmitt’s 1928 book on
Constitutional Theory (Verfassungslehre)27 and his related 1929 and 1931
works denying that courts could serve as “the Guardian of the
Constitution” (Der Hüter der Verfassung).28 During the same years,
Schmitt was also continuing to produce essays critical of the League of
Nations and its interventions into German territory and policy, as in
the management of the “demilitarized” Saar Basin or the FrenchBelgian occupation of the Ruhr to secure reparations payments.29
In this period, Smend was also advocating his own
constitutional doctrine, the Integrationslehre (theory of integration),
which focused its analysis on how the constitution of a state acts as a
force structuring the relationship of the individual with the political
group of which he or she is a part. Unlike Kelsen or other positivists,
Smend would not reduce the meaning of the state and its organization
to a set of formal legal norms. The state was instead an “ethical
totality” in the Hegelian sense: more than the sum of its members and
a source of meaning for their individual existences. Yet, unlike Schmitt,
he did not consider this ethical totality to be defined by potential
conditions of enmity with its non-constituents. Rather, it was best
understood as a kind of dynamic “living” organism continually
deepening the affective allegiance and fraternity of those already under
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL: EXPANDED EDITION
(George Schwab trans., 2008) (1932).
25
CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN (1932).
26
Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 58 ARCHIV FÜR
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK 1, 1–33 (1927).
27
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008)
(1928).
28
CARL SCHMITT, DAS REICHSGERICHT ALS HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG
(1929); CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG (1931).
29
See, e.g. Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Probleme im Rheingebiet [International
Legal Problems in the Rhein Basin] (1928) in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE: IM KAMPF
MIT WEIMAR-GENF-VERSAILLES 1923-1939 [POSITIONS AND CONCEPTS: I N
STRUGGLE WITH WEIMAR-GENEVA-VERSAILLES 1929-1939] (1988) (1940).
24
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its care,30 “integrating” them into a homogenized social whole: for
“[t]he realization of all ideal content . . . presupposes community.”31 In
a 1930 commentary, Hans Kelsen would harshly criticize this theory
with the charge that “it is a true fetish cult, what he is promoting with
the word ‘Life’ . . . the ‘Life’ of the State, as Smend means it—without
having the courage to clearly and directly say it—is the Life of a
superhuman being (übermenschlichen Wesens).”32
Meanwhile, Smend was also being criticized on the realist flank
by Schmitt, who considered his vision of integration and reconciliation
of differences as a “great placebo.”33 If the most intense forms of
human relationship comprised the sorting of groups into friends and
enemies, in an exceptional situation (Ausnahmezustand) that raised the
possibility of conflict, the sovereign “Decision” on the nature of the
political community would matter more than legal norms or the
affective bonding of its constituents.34
Schmitt’s state would be premised on the idea that Executive
authority (not judges or political parties) could best represent the
people’s true will and the society’s “concrete order.”35 This did not
necessarily mean constant intervention by the Executive, however.
Rather, it would embody sovereign power in the “state of exception”
when existing norms were inapplicable or unclear. Moreover, it would
do so primarily in order to preserve the existing situation, acting as a
conservative force in a manner that Schmitt sometimes encapsulated
with the medieval motto protego ergo obligo: “I protect, thus I oblige
[obedience].”36 If Smend’s thought was geared towards theorizing the
organic change over time of constitutional systems, Schmitt was

RUDOLF
SMEND,
VERFASSUNG
UND
VERFASSUNGSRECHT
[CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (1928).
31
Id.
32
HANS KELSEN, DER STAAT ALS INTEGRATION [THE STATE AS
INTEGRATION], 23–31 (1930).
33
Mehring, supra note 22, at 152 (citing Schmitt’s reference to “Integration,
das große Placebo”).
34
Schmitt, supra note 6, at 31.
35
Schmitt, supra note 27, at 85.
36
Schmitt, supra note 24, at 52 (“[t]he protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of
the state.”).
30
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preoccupied with discovering principles by which they might stay
unchanged in a chaotic world.
Xu’s close work with Smend began in the summer of 1929, just
as these constitutional debates were in full swing. As a result he became
deeply conversant with Schmitt’s ideas. At this point, he took part in
helping Smend to arrange a summer seminar on the topic of pluralism
and the state. Among the many sources and theories discussed,
sometimes identified in Smend’s notes with specific referral to Xu’s
participation, were numerous references to Schmitt’s ideas as well as
to Harold Laski’s theories on pluralism.37 Although describing the
experience as being “as stimulating as it is exhausting” (ebenso anregend
wie anstrengend), Xu acquitted himself well enough that by November of
the same year Smend had taken him on as a doctoral student.38 In a
Christmas Eve letter to his advisor that year, Xu mentions the
difficulties facing those seeking to conduct “polemic[s] against Carl
Schmitt.”39
Towards the end of Xu’s studies in 1931, he was as mentioned
above introduced to Schmitt personally via Smend’s referral, and the
two struck up a fast friendship, although one that would prove brief.
“Delighted over Hsü,” Schmitt wrote in his diary after one such
engagement.40 Continuing to see each other socially on several
occasions through the end of 1931, Xu and Schmitt discussed “China”
and “disarmament,” among other topics.41 The following year,
however, Xu returned to China, just as he was beginning to make a
mark on German legal scholarship.
The published version of Xu’s thesis, 1932’s Die
Verfassungswandlung,42 had considerable implications for contemporary
debates on the nature of constitutionalism, and at various points he
37
Cod_Ms_R_Smend_N_23 in NIEDERSÄCHSISCHE STAATS- UND
UNIVERSITÄTSBIBLIOTHEK GÖTTINGEN: NACHLASS RUDOLF SMEND.
38
Walravens, supra note 20, at 159.
39
Cod_Ms_R_Smend_A_388 (Hsü, Dau-Lin) at 5.
40
Schmitt, supra note 13.
41
Id.
42
HSÜ DAU-LIN, DIE VERFASSUNGSWANDLUNG [CONSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION] (1932).
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notes where his views converge or diverge from those of Schmitt.
Ultimately, however, Xu sought to provide his own novel theory of
the nature and forms of constitutional change. He did this by dividing
up the phenomena of constitutional change into different varieties
based on the degree to which the changes were deliberate or
involuntary, and took place through formal violation of existing rules
or instead via more gradual shifts in interpretation.43 Although on the
whole presenting an argument that leaned towards support of Smend’s
theory of organic integration as opposed to Schmitt’s Decisionism, Xu
also acknowledged that his views were, for example, “in agreement
with Schmitt on the increased importance of precedent for
constitutional and international law,” 44 as opposed to textualist fidelity
to the letter of the law.
Xu’s book, as well as the companion essay on “formalist and
anti-formalist concepts of the constitution” published the same year,45
built in various ways upon both Schmitt’s and Smend’s conceptions of
constitutional law. For Xu, as for both influential mentors, “the
incompleteness of constitutional norms in relation to the life lessons
of the State on the one hand, and the elasticity of their normativity on
the other hand” meant that the constitution would always be a means,
not an end, to realizing the full “political life” of the State.46 AngloAmerican style juristocracy and Kelsenian style positivism both fell
into the trap of substituting dead words on paper for living social
processes. On his book’s first page, citing the major statist public
intellectual Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929) (who in turn was
discussing the ancient Chinese Legalist philosopher Han Feizi 韩非子
(c. 279-233 BCE)), Xu noted that modern German thought and
traditional Chinese legal philosophy coincided in the awareness that

Id.
Id. at 119. On this point, see also the discussion in 陈新民 [Chen Xinmin],
惊鸿一瞥的宪法学彗星–谈徐道邻的宪法学理论 [Fleeting Glimpse of a Comet of
Constitutional Scholarship–On Xu Daolin’s Constitutional Law Theory], 38 軍法專刊 [MIL.
L. J.] 8, 16-25 (1992).
45
Hsü Dau-lin, Formalistischer und anti-formalistischer Verfassungsbegriff [Formalist
and Anti-Formalist Conceptions of the Constitution], 61 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN
RECHTS 1, 27–53 (1932).
46
Id. at 160
43
44
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“men, not laws, are what govern.”47 States are not identical with legal
norms, and thus their constitutions cannot consist only of unchanging
texts.
Xu emphasized, however, that it was also a mistake to go as far
as Schmitt in considering the constitution simply as a “mass of
unrelated constitutional statutes” with no inherent “logical unity.” 48 Xu
argued for a normative unity of the constitution in which any gaps in
the law could be filled by reference to shared community values or to
concrete relationships and shared living conditions.49 Xu’s constitution
is thus one that has “right answers” to its hard questions of
interpretation, and immanent norms capable of filling its apparent gaps
or overruling its formal rules. But these norms are not to be the
product of judges’ ideas about fundamental values—rather, they
should reflect the lived experience of the nation and its people. Xu
argued that Schmitt’s enthusiastic enthronement of the Executive as
the embodiment of the sovereign “decision”:
strips the concept of the constitution of any
connection with values and results in the
“constitution” signifying nothing but a decision . . .
The whole doctrine can then be reduced to the simple
formula: the constitution is whatever is framed as a
constitution (because all that lies within it is a decision),
it is valid because it is valid (whoever actually decides),
and as long as it is valid (because the reason for its
validity is not to be sought in the correctness of a norm,
but rather in its mere objective presence [in ihrem bloßen
Vorhandensein zu suchen]).50
In other words, Xu argued that Schmitt’s emphasis on the
Executive’s “Decision” embodying the sovereign will would result in
Hsü, supra note 42, at 1.
Hsü, supra note 45, at 40 (arguing that such views result in “eliminating all
value-content from the Constitution” and citing Schmitt, supra note 27, at 10).
49
Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 77–80 (1986) (Xu’s views are
much less judiciary-focused than Dworkin’s, however, and much more amenable to
an Executive-centered state order, if less so than Schmitt).
50
Hsü, supra note 45, at 53.
47
48
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an empty tautology: valid norms are those that arise from the Decision;
while the Decision is whatever produces valid norms. There was little
opportunity for public reason or democratic politics, given that
sovereign power would be reduced to a kind of “objective presence”
(Vorhandensein),51 In other words, Schmitt seemed to privilege life over
formal law, but in considering the Decision as something essentially
external and alien—something encountered by the legal interpreter,
rather than emerging as part of his or her subjective process of cocreation with fellow citizens—it could not (for Xu) capture the political
phenomenon of “self-rule” comprising modern democratic states.
Despite his criticisms, though, Xu still held that Schmitt’s antiformalism could help to refute the widespread fallacy among idealistic
Chinese intellectuals that a properly drafted Constitution would by
itself “solve” the concrete problems of State disorganization,
normative disagreement, and social disunity.52 Indeed, Xu would soon
find himself moving closer to Schmitt’s views in the course of his new
political career in China.
B. The Appeal of Authoritarian Constitutionalism
When Xu returned home, it was to a welcome reception in the
most elite circles of the Guomindang regime. Chiang Kai-shek himself
had been on very positive terms with Xu’s father before the latter’s
death.53 Moreover, Xu’s credentials as a legal theorist who was making
waves in the most prestigious corners of European legal scholarship
were extremely rare and impressive for the time. He was thus taken on
by Chiang as a high-level advisor as well as personal tutor to his son,

In fact, Xu is referring here to a specific statement in which Schmitt does
make use of the term Vorhandensein to describe the condition of constituent power
in the state after its founding. (In Verfassungslehre, Schmitt refers to the “constantly
existing presence (permanence) of the constituent power (ständiges Vorhandensein
(Permanenz) der verfassunggebenden Gewalt).”). However, Xu here clearly criticizes
“mere” (bloße) Vorhandensein as suffering from a lack of subjective engagement and
agency. The term had also recently been used in this negative sense by Martin
Heidegger in MARTIN HEIDEGGER, SEIN UND ZEIT [BEING AND TIME], 42, 203
(1967).
52
Hsü, supra note 42, at 27–8.
53
See, e.g. Xu supra note 16.
51
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Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋经国 (1910-1988) (who would eventually preside
over the liberalization of Taiwan in the 1980s).54
Soon after his return to China in 1932, Xu was appointed to
the ROC government’s National Defense Strategy Committee (Guofang
Sheji Weiyuanhui 國防設計委員會).55 He also published essays
promoting his views on legal and political issues, educational policy,
and diplomacy, as well as poetic compositions. However, in
comparison with his work in Germany, these were brief writings, at
times clearly geared primarily towards providing justifications for the
Guomindang’s dominance over political institutions. Somewhat
ironically, Xu’s interventions in ROC politics thus at times took on a
quite Schmittian tone, though he does not seem to have explicitly cited
his Berlin conversation partner.
For example, in a 1934 critique of the draft constitution that
had been produced by a relatively liberal-leaning committee headed by
John C.H. Wu 吴经熊 (1899-1986), who like Xu had also studied at
the University of Berlin (in Wu’s case under the neo-Kantian jurist
Rudolf Stammler), Xu seemingly took a page from the Decisionist
playbook. The draft constitution was flawed, he argued, because “a
‘good’ constitution that does not ‘take effect’ is no more than a scrap
of wastepaper . . . at a time when our country faces severe internal and
external disasters, we will only be able to pass through these if the
political authority is unified, while the political authority will only be
unified if its position is made secure.”56 Provisions such as promises of
local autonomy would only impede the decisive authority of the State,
as well as that of the Guomindang and Chiang Kai-shek himself,
guiding its path forward through the exercise of sovereign authority.

Xu would later serve as a high-ranking diplomat in Italy as well as in
successive posts as the secretary of various Chinese provinces, before returning to
academia in the last two decades of his life, spent primarily at the University of
Washington. See Chen, supra note 15; see also 马振犊 [MA ZHENDU] and 戚如高 [QI
RUGAO], 蒋介石与希特勒：民国时期中德关系研究 [CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND
HITLER: STUDIES ON SINO-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA] 65 (2012).
55
Id.
56
徐道鄰 [Xu Daolin], 憲法草案初稿商兌 [Considerations on the Draft
Constitution], 94 独立评论 [INDEPENDENT COMMENTARY] 9–11 (1934).
54
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Although Xu did not explicitly cite Schmitt in support of these
views, the latter was already being discussed by others in Chinese
publications. Schmitt’s writings on dictatorship, for example, were
prominently cited in Chinese translations of essays on “ancient and
modern concepts of dictatorship” by the influential Japanese political
theorist Imanaka Tsugimaru 今中次麿 (1893-1980).57 Imanaka, too,
viewed Schmitt’s description of the relationship between modern state
sovereignty and commissarial dictatorship as a major contribution to
understanding how the Executive power of the State could function
independently and authoritatively without sacrificing the premise of
popular representation—ideas that drew significant attention in
Japan.58
Another key figure who engaged with Schmitt in the early
1930s was Zhang Junmai 张君劢 (also known as both Carsun /
Carson Chang and Chang Chia-sen) (1887-1969), one of the most
significant independent political theorists and activists of the era. A
close associate of Liang Qichao, Zhang had later undertaken doctoral
studies in philosophy (switching from law) at the University of Berlin.
He developed a close relationship with the neo-Kantian philosopher
Rudolf Eucken before the latter’s death in 1926, co-authoring with him
a book on the respective outlooks on life of Europe and China.59
Having witnessed the end of the German Empire, Zhang initially
viewed the new Weimar Constitution as an excellent model for China
to follow,60 and in general sought to promote democratization via
activities such as founding an “Institute for Politics” in Shanghai that
sought to educate a new political elite that would not be tied to either
the Guomindang or the Communist Party, both of which he criticized.
He was also involved in popular writing and in party politics, and in all
今中次麿 [Imanaka Tsugimaru], 独裁政治概念之今昔 [Ancient and
Modern Concepts of Dictatorship], 7 国闻周报 [NATIONAL NEWS WEEKLY] 1–6 (1930)
(a multi-part essay continued in the following issue).
58
Id. Cf. Shiyake, supra note 3.
59
See overview of Zhang’s life and studies in ROGER B. JEANS, DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIALISM IN REPUBLICAN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF ZHANG JUNMAI (CARSUN
CHANG), 1906-1941 (1997).
60
陈新民 [Chen Xinmin], 德国基本法对台湾公法学的影响 [The Effect of
German Public Law on the Study of Public Law in Taiwan], 中德法学论坛 [JAHRBUCH
DES DEUTSCH-CHINESISCHEN INSTITUTS FÜR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT DER
UNIVERSITÄTEN GOTTINGEN UND NANJING] 23 (2009).
57
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of these arenas was critical of the ascendant Guomindang’s exclusion
of alternative voices. Though he at times courted sponsors within the
Guomindang or among regional warlords, he was also frequently
punished or intimidated for “excessive” criticism.
It was fleeing suppression by the Guomindang directly after its
re-unification of China in 1928 that brought Zhang back to Germany
the following year, to begin a period as a lecturer at the University of
Jena. While there, he continued to keep abreast of the latest discussions
on Staatsrechtslehre, in particular debates regarding the Weimar
Constitution and the relative merits of Russian and Italian
“dictatorship” as opposed to parliamentary democracy. Before
returning to China in 1931, Zhang published an essay on the “State
Crisis of the Chinese Republic” in the Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts.61
In it, he describes a global contest between the opposing political
outlooks of “Rechtsstaat und Diktatur.” China since 1928, he argued, had
been directing itself too much towards the latter, following in the
footsteps of Russia and Italy.62
Like Xu, Zhang both engaged with Schmitt and consciously
positioned his own views as being less fatalistically critical regarding
liberal political institutions. He nonetheless thought that Schmitt’s
theorization of the Weimar Constitution could be useful for the
purposes of articulating the limits of existing legal structures and the
scope of possible alternatives. Thus, he cites Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre
for the notion that “in a country where there is no press freedom or
right of association, and where no opposition party can be tolerated,
an election can be no more than an acclamation.”63 However, it is in
extending his critique to the political ideas and policies of the
Guomindang founder, Sun Yat-sen, that Zhang’s views tend to align
most closely with Schmitt’s. He accuses Sun of excessive imitation of
foreign models as opposed to the development of ideas based on
China’s own traditions, and also of subordinating China’s national

Carsun Chang, Die staatsrechtliche Krisis der chinesischen Republik, 19
JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 336–55 (1931).
62
Id. at 316–17.
63
Id. at 344, citing Schmitt, supra note 27, at 277.
61
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struggle to Soviet claims of internationalism that could in practice
signify infringements of China’s sovereignty.64
At the end of his essay, Zhang again cites Schmitt, this time his
Die Geistesgeschichtlichen Lage des Heutigen Parlamentarismus, for the notion
that the one party states of Italian fascism and Soviet communism are
each animated by a desire to pursue “élan vital” at the expense of their
formal legal systems.65 Like Schmitt, he was well aware of the appeal
of such ideas during an era of massive and sudden social and political
change, while warning against wholesale subscription to them as
opposed to concrete social structures. However, the binary opposition
of formal law versus a “living” political movement was for him too
simplistic. A party-led movement might actually be stultifying and
deadening for a society’s political development, while rule of law (but
not necessarily a full judicial constitutionalist or parliamentary system
after Anglo-American models) might instead prove the best way to
stimulate the State as an organic social unity. As he concludes, citing
Schmitt’s (at the time) “liberal nationalist” rival Otto Koellreutter, “[a]
‘national Rechtsstaat [legal state]’ that legally secures the basic rights of
the people while also giving the government a sufficient zone of action
is a state in which the People can enjoy the greatest justice and at the
same time is most useful for the existential struggle between
Peoples.”66
These comments help to concretize the lessons that some
prominent Chinese intellectuals drew from Schmitt’s Weimar-era
thought during the Nanjing Decade. Zhang and Xu, as two among
their country’s leading authorities on German legal and political theory,
both shared some criticisms of Schmitt’s Executive-focused state. Yet
at the same time they appreciated his formulation of basic questions
regarding the concrete preconditions for a stable political and legal
structure. They agreed with the basic premise that “[t]here exists no
norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a

64
65
66

Id. at 333–34.
Chang, supra note 61, at 355.
Id.
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normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who . . . produces and
guarantees the situation in its totality.”67
This problem of bringing about a “normal situation” upon
which the rule of law could be grounded was a preoccupation shared
by intellectuals in China both inside and outside of Guomindang
circles. Indeed, it was even a formal aspect of the Guomindang’s
official state theory, which was premised on a three-stage transition
from military rule (junzheng 军政) to “tutelary rule” (xunzheng 训政),
and only then to “constitutional rule” (xianzheng 宪政).68 During the
period of “tutelary rule” (aka “political tutelage”), the Guomindang
was to “lay the foundation for a total people’s government . . . [for
o]nly then will the constitution to be promulgated not become a mere
piece of paper[.]”69 This basic premise remained consistent from the
time that Sun Yat-sen developed his three-stage theory through the
end of Guomindang rule in China in 1949. Even those who sought to
push the Guomindang regime in a more democratic direction, Xu and
Zhang included, made allowances as to the need for a strong Executive
to ensure the “normal situation.”
On the basic grounds of state legitimacy, there was thus a
substantial compatibility between elements of Schmitt’s thought and
those of leading mainstream intellectuals. Meanwhile, another aspect
of receptivity to Schmitt’s thought lay in the realm of political
economy. Schmitt’s thought of the 1920s and early 1930s was often
directed towards seeking to define the state and its central figure, the
Executive, in such a manner as to ensure it supreme authority within a
constrained sphere. In particular, this implied the rejection of Marxist
views as to the domination of economic affairs by the state. Rather,
Schmitt advocated “a state that takes on the task of liberating the
economy, depoliticizing the socio-economic relations, [and] enabling
free economy in the social structure and mentality of society[.]”70 Such
a “qualitative” state would be able to “intervene freely to distinguish
Schmitt, supra note 6 at 13.
See, e.g. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA’S DESTINY AND CHINESE ECONOMIC
THEORY 124-127, 160-161 (1947).
69
Id. at 170.
70
Werner Bonefeld, Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to
the Euro, 43 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 4-5, 747-761 at 749 (2017).
67
68
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between the ‘friends’ of liberty and its ‘enemies,’”71 without being
dragged into a “quantitative” role due to mass democracy or the need
to administer a comprehensive welfare state.
These were views that Schmitt shared with the early ordoliberal
writers on political economy that also emerged out of the crisis of the
Weimar Republic. Figures like the economists Wilhelm Röpke and
Walter Eucken, among others, argued in terms similar to Schmitt’s that
“democracy can really function properly only when there is a certain
minimum of agreement about the essential problems of national life,”72
and that, as Friedrich Hayek would later advocate, “a dictatorship . . .
if self-limited [ ] may be more liberal in its policies than a democratic
assembly” given the latter’s potential to squelch economic freedom in
the name of a redistributive agenda.73 Koellreutter’s concept of a state
strong within its own “sufficient zone of action” that nonetheless
secured the (individual) rights of the people also, in fact, owed much
to Schmitt. Koeullreutter acknowledged as much later, writing for
example that Schmitt had been the first to develop the idea of a
constitutional system based on “institutional guarantees,” i.e. “not
individual rights . . . but the constitutional guarantee of certain
statutory arrangements (Rechtsinstituten),” of which “the most
important [include] the guarantee of private property[.]”74
These premises of Schmitt’s thought encapsulated a general
attitude among some conservative Weimar intellectuals of opposition
to mass politics (but above all Marxism) and a willingness to embrace
“dictatorial” Executive authority in suppressing them. This set of
positions was one that the democratic socialist jurist Hermann Heller
described as “authoritarian liberalism,” meaning by this a combined
commitment to “liberalization (Entstaatlichung) of the economy and
dictatorial control by the state of politico-intellectual functions.”75
71

Id.
Id.

(citing WILHELM RÖPKE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
DISINTEGRATION 253 (1942)).
73
THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL
THOUGHT COLLECTIVE, WITH A NEW PREFACE 446 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter
Plehwe eds., 2015).
74
OTTO KOELLREUTTER, DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT 62 (1952).
75
Hermann Heller, Authoritarian Liberalism, 21 EUR. LJ 295 (2015) (1933).
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Heller viewed Schmitt as embodying this position, for example in a
1932 lecture to business leaders on the topic of “A Sound Economy
in a Strong State” (Gesunde Wirtschaft im starken Staat).76
Schmitt’s works did indeed tend to reiterate a consistent set of
views regarding the role of an exceptional Executive authority to
maintain order and make possible basic legal guarantees, including
those of the capitalist economy. In this respect, too, they fit well with
the rising “rightist” tendency within the Guomindang, which was
shifting from Sun Yat-sen’s earlier emphasis upon “people’s
livelihood” to a more capital-friendly economic platform under
Chiang.77 Intellectuals associated with the regime thus found
themselves, like Xu, in effect arguing for an arrangement resembling
the authoritarian liberalism that Heller saw in Schmitt’s thought. In
general, however, political unity and empowering the Executive via
“authoritarian constitutionalism” took precedence over economics.
The Nazi era, of course, would change the way Schmitt was
read in China. Before the National Socialists rose to power in 1933,
Schmitt had not been sympathetic, seeing in them mass politics that
threatened state order. However, he quickly became a collaborator
with the new regime, producing justifications for Nazi policies that
awkwardly mixed his previous emphasis on concrete order with a new
appreciation for (non-Marxist) radical movements. Schmitt scholars
argue about the extent to which there was a “break” between his preand post-1933 thought.78 However, for foreign readers, there was
certainly a great deal of difference between studying Schmitt the
conservative critic of Weimar (before 1933) and studying the post1933 Schmitt who was one of the most respected academic
collaborators with the new regime. This “new” Schmitt did, however,
greatly interest some in China’s nascent mid-1930s fascist movement.

76
Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und Gesunde Wirtschaft: Ein Vortrag vor
Wirtschaftsführern (Lecture of 23 Nov. 1932) in Maschke supra note 11.
77
AUDREY WELLS, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SUN YAT-SEN:
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT 163 (2001).
78
See, e.g. Ingeborg Maus, The 1933 “Break” in Carl Schmitt’s Theory, 10
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 1, 125-140 (1997).
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III. SCHMITT AS GUIDE?: SEARCHING FOR A “SPECIAL PATH”
A. A “Stance of Critiquing Modernity”
Discussions of German state theory in China in the early-tomid-1930s should in general be seen in the context of an emerging
“debate over dictatorship,” in part directly inspired by the rise of
German Nazism, that was initiated by Chiang Kai-shek and some of
his close allies within the Guomindang.79 Indeed, some writers even
cited Xu’s advisor Smend, the theorist of “integration,” as support for
their arguments against premature democratization.80 When Schmitt
embraced Nazism, this made him useful for some public intellectuals
to justify the notion that China should establish its own form of
Guomindang-led fascism along German or Italian lines.
The most notable invocation of Schmitt to support such views
was an essay that appeared in the July 1934 issue of the magazine The
Future (Qiantu 前途), which was produced under the auspices of the
“Vigorous Practice Society” (Lixingshe 力行社).81 This was an
authoritarian group that overlapped with the fascist-leaning, so-called
“Blue Shirt Society” clique within the Guomindang.82 As part of a
general drive to promote (primarily Italian-style) fascism as a path
forward for China, The Future published large quantities of commentary
on the need for one party rule, obedience to Chiang as a dictatorial
79
WILLIAM KIRBY, GERMANY AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 155–70 (1984);
LLOYD EASTMAN, THE ABORTIVE REVOLUTION: CHINA U NDER NATIONALIST
RULE, 1927-1937 175–76 (1974). Although Chiang’s official push for dictatorial
status ended in failure by late 1934, the “debate over dictatorship,” including strong
views in favor, continued long after.
80
“霜露” [“Frost and Dew”], 德國國社黨運動的根本思想 [The Basic
Thought of the German National Socialist Movement], 1 警醒 [VIGILANCE] 9, 13–25 (1934).
81
On the background of the “Vigorous Practice Society” and its connection
with The Future, see 徐有威 [Xu Youwei]. 从《前途》杂志看德国法西斯主义在
战前中国之影响 [The Influence of German Fascism in Pre-War China as Seen in Qiantu
Magazine] 9 近代中国 [CONTEMPORARY CHINA] (1999).
82
See, e.g,. id. at 118–19. See also Lloyd E. Eastman, Fascism in Kuomintang
China: The Blue Shirts, 49 CHINA Q. 1, 1–31 (1972); MAGGIE CLINTON,
REVOLUTIONARY NATIVISM: FASCISM AND CULTURE IN CHINA, 1925-1937 5 (2017)
(discussing the background of The Future and its embodiment of fascist views in
Republican China).
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figure, the total elimination of communism, and defense of China’s
unique civilization against foreign invasions both military/political and
cultural.83 The Future, and its factional backers, operated with Chiang’s
tacit support but also competed with other factions within the
Guomindang. Chiang had, however, signaled meaningful backing to
the “Vigorous Practice Society” via various meetings and by having his
own remarks published in The Future. The magazine also served as a
major organ in announcing and advancing Chiang’s “New Life
Movement,” which was launched in 1934 as an attempt to “militarize
thoroughly the lives of the citizens of the entire nation so that they can
cultivate courage and swiftness, the endurance of suffering and a
tolerance for hard work, and especially the habit and ability of unified
action, so that they will at any time sacrifice for the nation.” 84
In the July 1934 issue of The Future, there appeared an essay
titled “Examining the Thought of the Fascist Political Theorist Carl
Schmitt,”85 which took the Nazi Party’s consolidation of power in
Germany as the starting point for an exploration of how “fascist
thought” could transform a society’s way of understanding politics.
Schmitt, taken as the intellectual architect of the new regime,86 could
provide new ideas for China to learn from. To this end, the essay lays
out brief summaries of Schmitt’s major works, and then summarizes
some of their key concepts. The initial focus is on four ideas that are
portrayed as fundamental: Decisionism, Confessionalism,
Existentialism, and the Friend-Enemy Relationship. The last of these
is then taken as the main theme for the next several pages, which
explain how Schmitt’s Concept of the Political is based on the fundamental
opposition of “friends” and “enemies,” as a binary opposition
different from that of morality (which opposes “good” and “evil”) or
Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley, Behind the Scenes of the Xi’an Incident: The
Case of the Lixingshe, 154 CHINA Q. 283, 283–307 (1998).
84
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 66 (John King Fairbank et al. eds, 1978)
(citing Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang tsung-t’ung ssu-hsiang yen-lun chi, 12.111 and Arif Dirlik,
The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution, 34 J
ASIAN STUD. 945, 945–80 (1975)).
85
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 法西斯政论家喀尔·修米特思想之检讨
[Examining the Thought of the Fascist Political Theorist Carl Schmitt], 2 前途 [THE FUTURE]
7 (1934).
86
But see Mehring, supra note 2 (on the limits of Schmitt’s actual influence,
and its rapid decline).
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economics (which opposes “profit” and “loss”). The political
opposition is an autonomous way of ordering the world, not
dependent on other factors, and it is the possibility of an enemy’s
existence that determines the nature of a political union.
After this discussion, the essay turns to the important role of
the concept of sovereignty in Schmitt’s work. Because law cannot
account for all potential situations, there will be certain exceptional
cases that must be decided by a practical political authority. This
implicates the famous first sentence of Political Theology: “Sovereign is
the one who decides upon the state of exception” (“Souverän ist, wer
über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.”).87 Over half a page, this
statement is translated in three slightly different ways, demonstrating
the difficulty of communicating Schmitt’s somewhat abstract and
technical point regarding the indeterminacy of legal norms to a general
audience unfamiliar with German jurisprudence.88 Moreover, it then
follows that this “exceptional” authority also necessarily implies an
ability to decide upon the true content of the legal norms to which
exceptions are being drawn. The leader is supposed to “guide” rather
than “command,” but should nonetheless be uniquely powerful and
generally obeyed.89
The essay in general portrays Schmitt as “opposing liberalism,
rationalism, and constitutionalism in favor of mobilization and a heroic
theory of struggle,”90 which ensures state unity and power by means of
his “theory of sovereignty based on the great manifestation of
‘Decisionism.’”91 In the very last section, it turns somewhat awkwardly
to the racial and ethnocentric context of Nazism and its connection
with demands for a “pure” and homogeneous racial subject of the
nation. Yao agrees in somewhat convoluted terms that “the concept
of leadership requires above all the element of a duty of loyalty
Schmitt, supra note 6, at 1.
Yao, supra note 85, at 6 (translating Schmitt’s phrase variously as “将这些
非常的特别的事项，给以有效的最终的决定的就是 国家的主权者”; “主权
，是非常特别事项的决定作用 (Decision [/] Entscheidung)” (German included
in original); “主权者，是非尋特别状态的决定者.”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1.
91
Id. at 6.
87
88
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(Treuepflicht) . . . and duties of loyalty are the same as legal duties.
[Meanwhile,] the German people require an equality based on race
(renzhong de pingdeng 人种的平等) to serve as the basis for realizing this
relationship of mutual loyalty and reliance[.]” In the same way, for
China too, mutual faith would develop “upon the basis of good
customs, not as in liberalism where laws only restrain conduct that is
within the scope of the law. The People of the State should have a
collective way of life consisting in ‘mutual reliance,’ and the People of
the State equate to the race[.]”92
This essay introducing Schmitt’s ideas to a general audience
was remarkable in several ways. While The Future regularly featured
praise for fascism93 (and, early on, many issues concluded with excerpts
from Mussolini’s memoirs), this was actually one of the only pieces in
the publication’s entire run that was devoted to exploring the views of
a single political theorist. For that reason, it would have particularly
caught readers’ attention. The author, Yao Baoxian 姚宝贤, was an
interesting figure who in many ways encapsulated the intellectual
ferment of the period and the diversity of approaches to seeking
China’s “way out” from modernity and its crises.
Yao was a prolific political and cultural essayist, and lay
Buddhist practitioner, who was born in Luhe (now part of Nanjing) in
1905.94 After graduating from the prestigious National Central
University in Nanjing, Yao studied philosophy in Tokyo between
1929-1931 at Taishō University (大正大学), a major center of
Buddhist studies affiliated with the Japanese Tendai tradition.95
Beginning in his teenage years, he published essays lamenting the
decadence and materialism that he saw as endemic among Chinese of
his generation, beginning with a short article in 1919 called “A Sincere
Id. at 6.
This was sometimes expressed in generic terms, i.e. 陈鲁仲 [Chen
Luzhong], 法西斯蒂运动与民族精神之发扬 [The Fascist Movement and the Uplifting
of the People’s Spirit], 2 前途 [THE FUTURE] 7 (1934). Other articles, meanwhile, went
into more detail regarding aspects of, especially, Italian policies and practices. But it
was highly rare to have the sustained focus on a single figure that Schmitt was
accorded in the July 1934 issue.
94
The basic elements of Yao’s personal history are covered in a
Guomindang personnel file stored at Academia Sinica: 129000016516A.
95
Id.
92
93
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Warning for Pessimistic Youth,”96 and continuing with pieces in which
he excoriated lack of national consciousness of his fellow students in
Nanjing.97 From the start, he viewed apathy as being as much a
psychological or spiritual deficiency as a political failing. In a 1924 essay
on “Youth and Labor,” for example, he extolled the power of physical
exertion to spark moral progress and invigorated thinking. Citing
Proudhon’s dictum that “property is theft,” he claimed that the
children of the wealthy had a particular need to commit themselves to
strenuous self-improvement activities and political activism.98
Evidently his views coincided sufficiently with those of certain
elements in the Guomindang for him to be inducted into the Party the
same year via the introduction of the prominent pro-German
intellectual, and soon-to-be high level government official Zhu
Jiahua.99 At the same time, however, Yao was also developing
idiosyncratic, revivalist Buddhist ideas regarding his generation’s path
to spiritual and political awakening, writing detailed essays on the
Indian roots of Buddhism, the concepts of karma and rebirth, the
history of East Asian civilizations and other such topics.
While in Tokyo, Yao continued diligently publishing,
beginning in 1929 with an article on “Neo-Kantian Socialism” that
engaged with the work of European Marxists such as Max Adler, as
well as the translation of an essay on “Fundamental Buddhism” by the
Japanese Buddhist scholar Ui Hakuju. 100 At the same time, Yao’s ideas
regarding the need to awaken Chinese national consciousness via
voluntarist activism on behalf of the nation-state took ever firmer root.
After his return to China in 1931, the more abstract visions of
liberation offered by socialism and Buddhism were diminished in his
writing by a strident nationalism that he promoted as a lecturer at the
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 对於抱悲观青年之忠告 [A Sincere Warning for
Pessimistic Youth], 广益杂志 [GUANGYI ZAZHI] 35, 56–7 (1919).
97
姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian], 雜感：南京的學生 [Random Impressions: Nanjing
Students], 5 民国日报·觉悟 [MINGUO RIBAO: JUEWU] 23 (1925).
98
姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian] 青年與勞動 [Youth and Labor], 2 教育与人生
[EDUC. & LIFE] 9 (1924).
99
Yao Baoxian Personnel File: 129000016516A.
100
姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian], 新康德派社会主义引端 [Introduction to NeoKantian Socialism] 10 民铎杂志 [THE PEOPLE’S TOCSIN] 2 (1929); 宇井伯壽 [Ui
Hakuju], 根本佛教 [Fundamental Buddhism], 10 民铎杂志 [THE PEOPLE’S TOCSIN]
1, 1–13 (1929) (姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian] trans.).
96
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Shanghai-based Chizhi University (Chizhi Daxue 持志大学),101 as a
member of various cultural and political organizations, and in
numerous writings. Echoing Guomindang appeals for ideological
“unity” among the populace, Yao focused in particular on the need to
educate the youth of China as consciously self-sacrificing ethical agents
working on behalf of the Chinese ethnos (minzu 民族) as the emissary
of a unique Asian civilization.102
Modern German thought and political practice could serve as
a key example in these regards. These themes are present, for instance,
in an essay on “Hegel’s Perspective on Religion” that Yao wrote for
the 1933 “Special Issue on Hegel” of the journal Philosophical
Commentary (Zhexue Pinglun 哲学评论).103 The following year, he then
argued again in favor of such ideas in another essay, this time on “The
National Theorist Hegel’s Philosophy of the State,” for the magazine
Youth and War (Qingnian yu Zhanzheng 青年与战争):
[Hegel] opposed Montesquieu’s theory of three
separate powers, and promoted instead the theory of
State unity . . . Hegel’s theory of the State is not a
position of utilitarian individualism . . . It treats the
State as the basis for the common spirit. What is the
common spirit? It is the concentration of a minzu’s
collective consciousness. When Napoleon occupied
Germany, this desperate situation shook awake the
national spirit. What a great event! [ . . . ] Now, the
great hero Hitler is howling mightily, and this too in
reality is the revival of Hegel’s theory of the State.
At present . . . especially those “distant climbers” in
China who believe in supranational theories need to do
101
See 中华学艺社总办事处 [CHINA ART STUD. SOC’Y OFF. ], 中华学艺
社社员录 [China Art Study Society Membership Roster] 88 (1935). Chizhi
University is the ancestor of today’s Shanghai International Studies University.
102
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 青年新生活运动具体之方案 [A Detailed Plan
for Youth in the New Life Movement], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 8, 15–19 (1934).
103
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 黑格儿之宗教观 [Hegel’s Perspective on Religion], 5
哲学评论 [PHIL. COMMENT.] 67–73 (1933). This issue also features an essay on
Hegel’s philosophy by Zhang Junmai.
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a detailed study of Hegel’s State philosophy. At the
same time, in order to progress in striving to make
Hegel’s ideal planned State into a reality, and to save
ourselves from the same despair that afflicted
Germany in his time, we have an urgent need to
faithfully defend our great leader!104
1934 was an especially productive year for Yao, with the
publication of the Schmitt article, the above piece on Hegel, and
various other essays for Youth and War on “unifying the thought of
Chinese youth,” Confucianism as an intellectual system,105 and ongoing
developments in Japanese society. In one of these essays, he boldly
sought to provide a “detailed plan” for youth education in Chiang’s
New Life Movement, and pointed out in terms drawn from
philosopher Henri Bergson that “we must recognize that all
transformation and change in the universe is a form of the original
force of élan vital (生的冲动); human life develops with purpose and
value in accord with this great flow of Life[.]”106 Despite his praise of
Hitler and somewhat strained, favorable comments on Nazi views of
racial homogeneity in 1934, Yao in general did not promote race-based
politics, but rather those based on “Asian civilization.” Indeed, he
rejected limiting that civilization to China, arguing that Buddhism, in
particular, could not be confined to any one national tradition.107
On the same date that Yao’s essay for The Future was published
another pro-fascist publication, the Hankou-based Vigilance (Jingxing
警醒), published its own slightly longer version of the essay under the
title “Nazi Political Thought: An Introduction to Car[l] SchmittDorotic.” Published under the pseudonym “Frost and Dew” (Shuang
Lu 霜露: a metaphor for enduring hardship), the version in Vigilance is
in most passages identical with the one appearing in The Future, but has
several pages of additional material discussing, for example, the
104
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 民族思想家黑格尔之国家观 [The National
Theorist Hegel’s Philosophy of the State], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 12–13 (1934).
105
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 中国儒教思想之体系 [The System of Chinese
Confucian Thought], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 5–7 (1934).
106
Yao, supra note 102.
107
姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 文化里面找不出‘本位’ [No ‘Native Place’ Can
Be Found in Culture], 6 现代 [THE MODERN] 4 (1935).

209

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:1

similarity between Schmitt’s views and those of Hobbes, as well as a
brief conclusion that states:
I have introduced here one of the most exceptional
theorists operating under the Nazi administration.
Although one feels there is room to criticize some
immaturity and arbitrariness in [Schmitt’s] constructive
theories, nonetheless much can be illuminated by his
stance of critiquing modernity. It can be said that this
point is something we should learn from him.108
“Frost and Dew” published a number of other pro-fascist
essays, along with pieces on other topics, during the brief run of
Vigilance. The thoughts he or she expresses generally resemble Yao’s,
although the Schmitt essay in The Future has a brief author’s note
(praising Leo Strauss) that does not appear in Vigilance, along with
other minor additions and subtractions.109 The exact circumstances
surrounding the origins of this article are quite murky, but at minimum
demonstrate clear interest in Schmitt among some in the
Guomindang’s fascist-leaning circles. As noted, this coincided with the
unsuccessful 1934 push within the Guomindang for an explicit turn to
dictatorial politics.
After 1934, however, other works did continue to appear that
explained Nazi views on law and politics in favorable terms, and
mentioning Schmitt in this capacity.110 A 1935 essay in the journal
Construction, for example, spends a few pages on Schmitt’s criticisms of
formalistic legal thought, based primarily on his Three Types of Juridical
Thinking. Following and based on this discussion, the essay asserts that
霜露 [“Frost and Dew”], 那齊斯的政治思想: Care [sic] Schmitt-Dorotic
的介紹 [Nazi Political Thought: Introducing Care [sic] Schmitt-Dorotic], 1 警醒
[VIGILANCE] 9–28 (1934).
109
Another difference is that the version of the Schmitt essay in The Future
contains very few misspellings of foreign words, while the version in Vigilance is rife
with them (including Schmitt’s first name in the title). Such misspellings could easily
arise from printer’s errors, however, rather than from the author’s own manuscripts,
and so likely are of no use in attributing authorship.
110
Multiple works of his are cited, for example, in 国社党的法律 [THE
LAW OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY] (杉村章三郎 [Shōzaburō Sugimura] and
叶翔之 [Ye Chizhi] trans., 1935).
108
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there is a need for a “fundamental transformation of legal theory” to
meet modern political conditions.111 The Russian/Italian (and now also
German) emphasis upon a Party-led Diktatur, which Zhang Junmai
had warned against, was by the mid-1930s appealing to a significant
constituency among Chinese intellectuals. Those reading the above
publications would see Schmitt as an important expositor of such
approaches.112
More ambivalent 1930s writings on Nazi German politics or
law also occasionally mentioned Schmitt, though often only briefly.
The prominent legal theorist Qian Duansheng 钱端升, for example,
wrote a 1934 book on The Government of Germany that briefly includes
Schmitt’s criticism of parliamentarism in its citations and also discusses
the “state of exception” in terms that seem drawn from Schmitt’s
writings.113 Also notable are the writings of two legal scholars, Zhou
Ziya 周子亚 and Zhu Jianmin 朱建民, who conducted master’s
degree (Diplom) level studies in law at the University of Berlin between
1936–1938. Upon returning to China, they taught at the National
Chengchi University and became co-editors of a journal called New
Politics (Xin Zhengzhi 新政治). Zhou briefly mentioned Schmitt in

徐炎 [Xu Yan], 德国国社党的国家和法律观 [The German National
Socialist Party’s View on Law and the State], 6 行健月刊 [CONSTRUCTION] 98 (1935)
(this essay is labeled as a reprint of one that appeared the same year in the journal
Transformation [Gaizao 改造]).
112
There do not appear to have been translations of any complete works of
Schmitt’s into Chinese during this period. However, some of his works in German
were available in Chinese libraries. For example, the Oriental Library in Shanghai
(which was destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1932 and subsequently restored)
received a large collection of donated books from Germany in 1934 that included
Schmitt’s Political Romanticism and The Concept of the Political. 方图书馆复兴委员会编
[COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE ORIENTAL LIBRARY], 德国捐赠东方图书
馆书籍展览纪要 [Summary of Books Donated from Germany to the Oriental
Library] (方图书馆复兴委员会编 [COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE
ORIENTAL LIBRARY], 1935).
113
钱端升 [QIAN DUANSHENG], 德国的政府 [THE GOVERNMENT OF
GERMANY] 12 (1934). Qian’s book cites many of the other leading legal theorists of
Weimar and early Nazi-era Germany, but of Schmitt’s work only The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy is explicitly included. On the other hand, some references to
the state of exception do also seem to draw on Schmitt’s thought.
111
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pieces introducing Nazi law and politics,114 while Zhu, in a 1940 book
on aggression in international law, cites Schmitt’s essays on Die
Kernfrage des Völkerbundes [The Core Question of the League of
Nations] (1926) and Der Völkerbund und das politische Problem der
Friedenssicherung [The League of Nations and the Political Problem of
Securing Peace] (1931). 115 Unlike either the critiques or pro-fascist
writings noted above, these citations are essentially neutral discussions
of legal principles.
Some other intellectuals during the Nanjing Decade made
more critical references to Schmitt’s work. The activist, human rights
advocate, and China Democratic League co-founder Chow ChingWen 周鲸文 (1908–1985), for example, explained in a 1939 collection
of essays from his Hong Kong-based journal Modern Critique (Shidai
Piping 时代批评) that “Professor Schmitt states that if there was
nothing in the structure of the universe such as war that implicates the
survival or extermination of human beings . . . then it would also lose
all political characteristics.”116 Such bellicosity was for Chow endemic
of “nationalism that has taken a wrong path,” in contrast to which he
argued for a nationalism based on Confucian virtues of “benevolence
and virtue” as well as liberal ideals of “freedom and equality.”117
Marrying a form of cosmopolitanism with a sense of China’s unique

See, e.g. 周子亚 [Zhou Ziya], 國社主義政治學說與其實施 [National
Socialist Political Theories and Their Implementation] 1 新政治 [NEW POLITICS] 94–7
(1939) (discussing, for example, Schmitt’s arguments in his Verfassungslehre that
political legitimacy can be derived only via theological claims, on the one hand, or
democratic will on the other, then linking these to the Nazi political arrangement in
which the “Movement” represents the People). Later, Zhou briefly mentions Schmitt
again the following year in an essay on “National Socialist Views on International
Law.” 周子亚 [Zhou Ziya], 國社主義的国际法学说 [National Socialist Theory of
International Law] 3 新政治 [NEW POLITICS] 72–7 (1940). This latter essay, however,
appears to be translated without attribution from a 1938 article that appeared in The
American Journal of International Law: Virginia L. Gott, National Socialist Theory of
International Law, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 704 (1938).
115
朱建民 [ZHU JIANMIN], 侵略问题之国际法的研究 [RESEARCH ON
THE ISSUE OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1940).
116
周鲸文 [CHOW CHING-WEN], 中华民族在一切民族革命斗争中的
领导地位 [THE LEADING POSITION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF ALL PEOPLES] (1939).
117
Id.
114

212

2020

Chinese Receptions of Carl Schmitt Since 1929

8:1

and grandiose fate, his volume ultimately calls for China to act as
“leader in the liberation of the world’s nations.”118
Even for liberals like Chow, it was appealing to think that
China had an exceptional role in world history beyond mere integration
into an Anglo-American-dominated world order. For Yao, China’s
ability to redefine itself as a modern state would be in part based on an
awareness of its status as one of the hubs of East Asian and Buddhist
civilization, and this identity would help it to define its political friends
and enemies. Meanwhile, the related but competing idea that China’s
special destiny was intimately tied with Japan’s prompted a very
different set of engagements with Schmitt’s work, providing a rationale
for some collaborators with Japanese imperialism.
B. Hegemony in an Asian Großraum
The pro-fascist KMT clique that had created The Future
magazine, and that would have had editorial control over the article on
Schmitt, had, by the late 1936 “Xi’an Incident” and its aftermath, lost
a great deal of its influence, reducing the space for such views. 119 The
war with Japan from 1937 dominated political discourse, which made
calls for immediate political transformation seem to many like
unwelcome distractions. Meanwhile, the renewed United Front
between the KMT and the Communist Party in order to resist Japan
meant that the most extreme advocacy of one-party rule was out of
step with official policies. Though debates on constitutionalism
continued even during the height of the war, these discussions often
tended to be more limited in scope than in the mid-1930s. 120
As the Republic of China’s crises continued, Yao Baoxian
would continue in his writings to veer between spiritual topics, calls

Id.
See Xu and Billingsley, supra note 83.
120
An exception is a 1940 special issue on constitutionalism of Zhou Ziya
and Zhu Jianmin’s New Politics journal. In the essays within, authors laid out various
different positions either calling for immediate implementation of a justiciable
constitution or arguing that this would be detrimental during the period of war with
Japan. Yao contributed one essay, characteristically arguing in favor of one party rule
until China’s exceptional crises were overcome.
118
119
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for political dictatorship and consolidation of the Guomindang’s one
party rule, discussions of East Asian societies and their mutual
relations, occasional forays back into German state and political
theory, and a variety of other subjects. Explicit references to Nazism
came to be very few, given Germany’s increasingly close ties with an
invading Japan, and similarly the focus on Schmitt’s thought also did
not reappear after the prominent 1934 essay. In 1937, Yao became the
editor of a new journal based first in Nanjing, then in Hankou, named
Founding (Chuangdao 创导). Though this venture ended in 1938, Yao
continued to promote his brand of Asianist Hegelianism in the service
of China’s struggle, viewing Japanese invasion as an existential threat
to China’s political identity despite their cultural ties.
While Yao’s interest in fascism and pan-Asianism did not lead
him to accept Japanese claims to leadership in Asia, that was not true
of some others with similar inclinations. Indeed, there were Chinese
academics collaborating with the Japanese occupation regime who
cited Schmitt’s thought to justify the idea of a Japan-led “Greater EastAsia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Especially of note is Hu Yingzhou 胡瀛
洲, a prominent professor at the Peking University law faculty, whose
1942 book “The Study of Politics” (政治學) featured many citations
to Schmitt’s thought and also promoted his theory of “an international
legal order of ‘great spaces’” (Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung / 国际
法上之大地域秩序).121
Schmitt developed his conception of the Großraum, or “great
space,” after internal pressure within Nazi circles led to his increasing
marginalization and loss of influence. Turning away from domestic
legal topics, he adopted this term that had previously been applied in
primarily economic contexts, but that also had obvious political
implications, as his new primary focus. A Großraum was a large regional
order of social, economic, and political linkages forming a selfsufficient system centered on one hegemonic state. In Schmitt’s own
context, these ideas would suggest developing a continental European
order based on German leadership to counter “spatially alien” AngloAmerican and Soviet incursions.122 In its basic parameters, this notion
胡瀛洲 [HU YINGZHOU], 政治學 [THE STUDY OF POLITICS ] (1942).
See, e.g. Carl Schmitt, Raum und Großraum im Völkerrecht [Space and
Großraum in International Law] (1940) in Maschke, supra note 11, at 249; Carl Schmitt,
121
122
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was highly compatible with other writings on hegemony by
conservative authors during the Nazi period.123 Its most innovative
feature, however, was the premise that the “great spaces” of empires
in various regions of the world could form the basis for a stable new
international order, along the lines of the United States’ Monroe
Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, Schmitt specifically
cited Japan’s role in China as embodying an “Asia Monroe-shugi” that
showed the general validity of his theory.124
These views were both amenable and useful to some Japanese
scholars seeking to theorize Japan’s claim to regional hegemony, and
to some Chinese intellectuals that collaborated in such efforts. In a
1944 article, for example, Hu explained that:
the concept of an order of great spaces originated with
Japan [and] its New Order for East Asia. However, not
many people have yet contributed new political
analysis [to this idea]. In German scholarship, the first
to use the idea of an ‘order of great spaces’ was Carl
Schmitt, in his ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung’
. . . Schmitt explains that the order of great spaces
contains not only the idea of cooperation, but also of
. . . a great sphere of politics . . . in which a leading
people acts as the center to unite the whole into a
political force.125
This article appeared in the journal Songs of Chu, an organ of
the Wang Jingwei regime, for which Hu was by this point serving as
the Hubei provincial propaganda chief. On the page containing the
above excerpt, just below the mention of Schmitt’s 1937 article, there
was posted a photograph of a “political [study] conference” (zhengzhi
Völkerrechtliche Formen des Modernen Imperialismus [Forms of Modern Imperialism in
International Law] (1932) in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR –
GENF – VERSAILLES 1923-1939 (1988) (1940).
123
See, e.g. HEINRICH TRIEPEL DIE HEGEMONIE: EIN BUCH VON
FÜHRENDEN STAATEN (1938).
124
Carl Schmitt, Großraum gegen Universalismus, (1939) in POSITIONEN UND
BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR – GENF – VERSAILLES 1923-1939 (1988) (1940).
125
胡瀛洲 [Hu Yingzhou], 世界新秩序论 [The Theory of New World Order],
1 楚声 [SONGS OF CHU] 5 (1944).

215

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:1

zuotanhui 政治座谈会), strongly suggesting that Schmitt’s thought,
along with that of other foreign scholars amenable to the new
academic environment within Japan’s imperial possessions, was a topic
of officially-sponsored study. Indeed, the war period and its aftermath
saw various direct and indirect references to Schmitt’s thought in
works available in Japanese-occupied areas.126
In Japan itself, conservative authors were also citing Schmitt
during the war years, both in reference to the Großraum and regarding
his earlier writings against parliamentarism and in favor of
commissarial dictatorship.127 Schmitt’s Japanese readers spanned the
political spectrum however. For example, the sociologist and
philosopher Shimizu Ikutarō 清水幾太郎 (1907-1988), who was
influenced by both Marxism and John Dewey’s pragmatism, published
a volume in 1939 on “The True Nature of Politics” (政治の本質)
(1939). This book, which comprised Japanese translations of Max
Weber’s Politics as a Vocation and Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, was
available in some libraries in occupied areas of China.128 Schmitt’s ideas
were also critically engaged with in some texts on historical and cultural
topics by openly leftist Japanese authors.129

See, e.g. 张榆芳 [ZHANG YUFANG], 何谓新秩序? [WHAT IS ‘NEW
ORDER’?] (1943) (Describing a philosophy of “great space-ism” [大地域主义] that
is clearly derived from Schmitt’s conception of a Großraum order).
127
大串兎代夫 [Toyō Ōgushi], 指導者原理論 [The Führerprinzip] in 大日
本赤誠會思想局 [GREAT JAPAN SINCERITY ASSOCIATION THEORY
DEPARTMENT], 戰時國民講座 [WARTIME LECTURES TO THE NATION] 219–22
(1942) (discussing Schmitt’s theory of commissarial dictatorship “to save the people”
during emergencies, his critique of parliamentarism’s inability to produce political
decisions, and arguing that Hitler’s extraordinary powers were “just as Schmitt
described, entrusted to him by the entire German people.”).
128
哈尔滨图书馆増加图书目録 [HARBIN LIBRARY EXPANDED BOOK
CATALOGUE], 21 (竹内正一 [Takeuchi Shōichi] ed., 1939).
129
永田广志 [NAGATA HIROSHI], 科学的历史观 [A SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORY], (阮均石 [Ruan Junshi] trans., 1938) (calling Schmitt an
important Catholic thinker seeking to promote Urmonotheismus as a “bourgeois
reaction against pantheism”); 堀伸二 [HORI SHINJI], 大众政治学 [MASS POLITICAL
SCIENCE], (谢叔良 [Xie Shuliang] trans., 1948) (citing Schmitt’s views as
representing important strains of fascist political thought, for example, the critique
of Parliamentarism as incapable of producing political decisions and the view that
Führertum is not simply “command”).
126
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Immediately after the war, there were of course few Chinese
intellectuals engaging with theories, or authors, who had helped to
supply rhetorical ammunition for the defeated invader. One of the only
major mentions of Schmitt in official discourse in the following years
came via comments by a leading Soviet intellectual in a 1949 volume
of essays “On Internationalism and Nationalism” that was produced
by the Chinese Communist Party’s New China Press (Xinzhongguo Shuju
新中国书局) as part of its “Cadre Study Collection” (Ganbu Xuexi
Congshu 干部学习丛书).130 The second-ranking Communist Party
leader Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898-1969) was listed as the main author of
the volume, which opens with an essay he had written for the People’s
Daily the previous November, and which was also separately published
as a pamphlet.131 After Liu, the book also includes essays by Lenin,
Stalin, the Finnish-Soviet philosopher and Central Committee member
Mikhail Davidovich Kammari (1898-1965), and the Soviet Jewish jurist
Aron Trainin (1883-1957), with two pieces by Mao Zedong towards
the end of the volume.
Trainin’s translated essay on “National Independence and
Internationalism”132 is the only one to mention Schmitt, but it does so
in a prominent manner in its opening pages that reflects interestingly
on the rest of the volume’s contents. First, Trainin notes that the
world’s two “camps,” the imperialists of the West and the democratic
camp of socialist states, had different views on the importance of
national sovereignty. Even as the socialist states were calling for an
order in which sovereignty would be respected, the West was seeking
(with ulterior motives, in Trainin’s view) to reestablish dialogues that
would diminish this principle’s importance:
German fascists openly promoted the view that
national sovereignty had to be eliminated. They
130
刘少奇
[LIU
SHAOQI]
et.
al
国际主义与民族主义
[INTERNATIONALISM AND NATIONALISM] (1949).
131
刘少奇 [Liu Shaoqi], 国际主义与民族主义 [Internationalism and
Nationalism], 人民日报 [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Nov. 7, 1948).
132
特莱宁 [Aron Trainin], 民族独立与国际主义 [National Independence and
Internationalism], in Liu, supra note 130, at 61. The essay is attributed only to
“Telaining,” however given its context and content, it is almost certainly by Trainin.
“Telaining” had also been used as the transliteration of Trainin in other publications.
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claimed that the rule of the higher race had to be
guaranteed through a Lebensraum [Shengcun Kongjian 生
存空间] that would sacrifice many other states. The
people of the sacrificed states would be relegated to the
status of “inferior races.” Carl Schmitt is one of the
pillars of fascist “legal theory.” He sought with all his
might to establish the view that under the conditions
of modern production, the old nation-state
independence and autonomy have lost all meaning.
Thus the “theory” that he set forth was one filled with
imperialist thinking: the “Großraum theory” [Guangda
kongjian de lilun 广大空间的理论]. Based on this
theory, other states, and especially those of Slavs and
other ethnicities, should lose their economic and
political autonomy.
Currently the discussions over issues of postwar
organization that are occurring within the imperialist
camp reflect the fascist Großraum theory. The
imperialist elements are seeking by means of a vacuous
rhetoric of “democracy” to restore and to camouflage
this fascist Großraum theory. Some evidence for this is
in the highly successful outline by the reactionaries in
the United States for establishing a “world
government,” and Churchill and his conservatives’
plan for a “United States of Europe,” which in reality
would be making Europe serve the interests of the
American and British imperialists. In the Marshall Plan
and the militarily dangerous “Western Alliance”
(NATO), etc., there is the full and clear demonstration
of the attempt to economically and politically subjugate
various nations, and to unite in alliance with
reactionary governments, in order to oppose the Soviet
Union and other people’s democracies.133
This Party-approved reader is indicative of the lack of a
receptive audience among Chinese Communist circles for Schmitt or
133

Id.
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his ideas during the period of renewed civil war and at the time of the
PRC’s founding in 1949. It does, however, indicate that at least some
within the Party’s intelligentsia were likely familiar to some degree with
Schmitt’s ideas, at least via Trainin’s criticism and through the profascist writings of the period noted above. Schmitt thus makes his first
appearance in a Party ideology document as an apologist for
imperialism, to be condemned for rejecting the principle of national
sovereignty. The ideology of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere” was tied to the Großraum, as were the new American-led
attempts to create a “space” for transnational managerialism under the
NATO security umbrella, for example. With his wartime justifications
of regional hegemony by powerful central states, Schmitt had
articulated a hierarchical idea of international relations that the Soviet
bloc as well as the Chinese Communists rejected in principle.
However, the problem of how to structure a world divided into two or
more competing “great spaces” was indeed a key dynamic of the Cold
War period that was to follow.
The apparent sole direct mention of Schmitt in an early
Chinese Communist Party document thus labeled him as persona non
grata. However, as he himself would come to believe, China’s
subsequent path under Mao would in many respects make manifest his
major themes of autochthonous politics, civilizational autonomy, and
the task of defining a Großraum resistant to foreign universalist
incursions.134 In his 1963 Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt notes the insight
of one of Mao Zedong’s poems, “Kunlun” (1935), in which the latter
imagines taking a sword to split the world into three pieces: “one
inherited by Europe, one presented to America, and one left to
China.”135 Ironically, in Mao’s 1963 revision of the poem, published
the very same year as Schmitt’s book, he changes “China” (Zhongguo 中
国) into “Eastern Countries” (Dongguo 东国), adding a footnote that
says “the main thought of this poem is anti-imperialist, and nothing
else[,] I have changed the line ‘one left to China’ into ‘one returned to
the Eastern Countries.’ Forgetting the Japanese isn’t right. Now
Regarding Schmitt’s general late interest in China, cf. Mehring, supra note
2, at 492–94.
135
CARL SCHMITT, THEORY OF THE PARTISAN: INTERMEDIATE
COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 41 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2007)
(translation modified to reflect the verbs used in Mao’s original).
134
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England, America, and Japan are all mentioned. Any other
interpretations aren’t realistic.” 136
In general, the advent of the Cold War saw Schmitt’s earlier
interlocutors turn to other influences and pursuits. Xu Daolin, for
example, spent much of the war as a diplomat posted to Rome. In
January 1953, as Xu was beginning to turn his focus back to academia,
he wrote to his old advisor Smend asking him for guidance on recent
developments in legal and political theory, culminating with the
question “What is Carl Schmitt writing?”137
Despite this expression of continued interest in Schmitt,
however, Xu does not seem to have turned to him in any subsequent
work, which as mentioned centered largely on the study of pre-Qing
Chinese legal history. Similarly, Zhang Junmai did not explicitly engage
with Schmitt’s thought in his post 1930s public career. He had
continued to exercise influence as a gadfly to both the Guomindang
and Communist Parties, as the founder of the attempted “third force”
Democratic Socialist Party (which he originally named the “National
Socialist Party”), and an advocate for a more pluralistic multi-party
system. Despite (or rather because) of his non-aligned status, he was
later a significant leader in the drafting the Republic of China’s 1946
Constitution (which occurred with US consultation as part of an
attempt to create a national unity government).138 The 1946
Constitution was, however, infamously suspended by the
Guomindang’s “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”
(Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan 動員戡亂時期臨時條款).
These Provisions placed the Republic into a state of exception, granted
Chiang Kai-shek decisive authority, and would forestall development
of a multi-party democratic system until they were finally lifted in
1992.139

136

毛泽东 [MAO ZEDONG], 毛主席诗词 [POEMS

OF

CHAIRMAN MAO]

(1963).
Cod_Ms_R_Smend_A_388: 19.
Jeans, supra note 59; see also Chen, supra note 60.
139
The legal scholar Chen Xinmin offers insightful commentary tying this
roundabout journey to constitutionalism to Xu Daolin’s vision of constitutional
137
138
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IV. SCHMITT REDISCOVERED
A. Against Romanticized Politics
Throughout most of the Cold War period, explicit citation of
Schmitt’s ideas became unpalatable (if to different degrees) in both
Mainland China and Taiwan. There does not seem to have been any
notice by PRC officials of his 1963 book praising Mao, though there
may potentially be evidence in diplomatic archives or elsewhere that
would indicate otherwise. In addition, neither the doctrinaire Marxism
of PRC academia through the end of the Cultural Revolution nor the
freer, but still constrained discourse of Taiwan during Chiang’s lifetime
were conducive to engagement with heterodox legal or political theory.
In the 1980s and 1990s, with Reform and Opening-Up in
China and a more comprehensive liberalization of Taiwan’s
government and society, Schmitt again began to influence discourse.
A handful of articles mentioning Schmitt can already be found in
Mainland China in the early 1980s. 140 However, his first major
“interventions” into important debates would occur in Taiwan, where
the influential legal scholar and later justice of the Judicial Yuan, Wu
Geng 吳庚 (1940-2017), was one of his major advocates and
interpreters. Wu was born into a Catholic family in Guangdong, and
moved with his mother to Taiwan after the Communist victory in
1949, rising from poverty to obtain an elite legal education.141 Between
1974 and 1977, he earned a Ph.D. in public law at the University of
transformation, when he notes that the general course of Taiwan’s democratization
has occurred “not via extreme bloodletting, violence, revolution, or legislation by the
ruling authorities, but rather via judicial interpretations by the Judicial Yuan, in one
case after another . . . in what could be called a silent constitutional transformation
(stillschweigende Verfassungswandlung)” in Chen, supra note 15, at 25 (citing Hsü, supra
note 42 for the concept of “silent constitutional transformation.”).
140
These early 1980s mentions include negative references to Schmitt’s
Großraum theory as a justification for Nazi expansionism. See 李家善 [Li Jiashan], “
反霸”是国际法的一个基本原则 [‘Anti-Hegemony’ Is a Fundamental Principle of
International Law]; 法学 [L. SCI.] 1, (1983); 李家善 [Li Jiashan], 格老秀斯——近代
国际法的奠基人 [Grotius: Founder of Modern International Law], 法学研究 [CHINESE
J. L.] 5 (1983). There are also scattered references in some translated texts.
141
See 翁岳生 [Weng Yuesheng] et al., 緬懷大法官吳孟庚先生
[Remembering Justice Wu Geng], 中研院法學期刊 [ACADEMIA SINICA L. J.] 22 (2018).
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Vienna. In 1978, he published with Springer his thesis on “The State
Theory of Han Fei: A Contribution to the Chinese Idea of State
Reason,”142 analyzing the thought of the pre-Qin Legalist authoritarian
philosopher Han Fei and comparing it to that of Western thinkers such
as Machiavelli and Hobbes.143 Although Schmitt’s views would have
been highly relevant as a point of analysis, he was not cited in this book,
suggesting that Wu was not yet familiar with his ideas.
Upon returning to Taiwan and taking up a position as a
professor at the prestigious National Taiwan University, Wu continued
to develop his interest in illiberal legal thought and his reading of
relevant German sources. It is at this point that he turns to Schmitt in
his work, as demonstrated in his 1981 study of Carl Schmitt’s thought
titled The New Political Romanticism: A Study of Carl Schmitt’s Political
Theory.144 The title, a reference to Schmitt’s 1919 book Politische
Romantik, supplied Chinese legal and political scholars wary of overly
rapid liberalization with a striking new epithet against calls for radical
transformation. In Wu’s subsequent work, including his 1993 book on
Max Weber’s thought, he continued to find inspiration in Schmitt’s
realist approach to legal analysis—specifically, the premise that law is
the emanation of a “concrete order” of society, and that its content
should be understood on that basis.145
This idea would go on to animate Wu’s own jurisprudence as
a highly influential justice of the Judicial Yuan and as one of Taiwan’s
foremost authorities on administrative law. Wu led a reception of
Schmitt’s ideas in Taiwan that later took on (arguably) “liberal”
characteristics over time, with a focus on, for example, analysis of the
constitution by reference to basic rights presumed to be outside the
possible scope of amendment (as they are part of the basic political
142
WU GENG, DIE STAATSLEHRE DES HAN FEI — EIN BEITRAG ZUR
CHINESISCHEN I DEE DER STAATSRAISON [THE STATE THEORY OF HAN FEI: A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHINESE IDEA OF RAISON D’ÉTAT] (1978).

Id.
吳庚 [WU GENG], 政治的新浪漫主義 : 卡爾.史密特政治哲學之
研究 [THE NEW POLITICAL ROMANTICISM: A STUDY OF CARL SCHMITT’S
POLITICAL THEORY] (1981).
145
吳庚 [WU GENG], 韋伯的政治理論及其哲學基礎 [MAX WEBER’S
POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS ] (1993).
143
144
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consensus that is a prerequisite for the constitution’s existence in the
first place).146 Meanwhile, however, this same doctrine also suggests
sharp limits to the potential for rapid political transformation or
reform. It suggested that a society like Taiwan’s, or Mainland China’s,
could not suddenly transform its political system due to shifts in the
popular will. Wu’s application of Schmitt’s constitutional doctrine, to
a certain extent, helped create a state in which liberalization could be
pursued without necessarily implying a recourse to mass democracy.147
Only slightly later, some scholars in the PRC also turned new
attention to Schmitt. Brief mentions in the early 1980s by the East
China Normal University (“ECNU”) historian of international law Li
Jiashan 李家善 show Schmitt’s continued disrepute due to the
Großraum theory–an example of “‘hegemony’-promoting ‘claims’ and
‘theories’ that made noise for a time but never had any place in the
mainstream of international law . . . and have been condemned and
criticized by legal scholars the world over.”148 Nonetheless, a few legal
scholars in the PRC did begin to cite Schmitt favorably during the
1980s, likely influenced by the growing discourse in Taiwanese legal
circles as well as awareness of Schmitt’s role in Japanese legal
scholarship (where he had never gone fully out of fashion), and of
course in German work on law and politics.149
The Chinese University of Politics and Law professor Dong
Fanyu 董璠舆, for example, cited Schmitt in 1987 as the “most cleareyed pioneer in opening up the study of . . . constitutional
preambles.”150 Relying on Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre (via the mediation
of Japanese legal scholarship) as his main theoretical support, Dong
See discussion in Shu-Perng Hwang, Carl Schmitt in Taiwanese Constitutional
Law: An Incomplete Reception of Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory in Marchal and Shaw, supra
note 4.
147
See Chen, supra note 15 at 25 (citing Hsü, supra note 42).
148
See Li, supra note 140.
149
See, e.g. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Politische Theorie und Politische
Theologie: Bemerkungen zu ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis [Political Theory and Political Theology:
Comments on Their Mutual Relationship], 19 REVUE EUROPÉENNE DES SCIENCES
SOCIALES 233–43 (1981).
150
董璠舆 [Dong Fanyu], 关于宪法序言及其法律效力 [On the
Constitutional Preamble and its Fundamental Principles], 政法论坛 [TRIB. POL. SCI. & L.]
22 (1987).
146
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argues that the preamble to the PRC Constitution (which explains the
basis of the legal system as an outgrowth of the Party’s liberation and
leadership of the Chinese people) should be used as a source of norms
to clear up ambiguities in constitutional interpretation in favor of Party
authority.151 This notable application of Schmitt’s constitutional ideas
(thematically similar to that of Wu Geng in Taiwan, but with different
practical implications based on the PRC’s political context) would
reappear later on in the works of constitutional scholars Jiang Shigong
and Chen Duanhong.
Those who were not exposed to Japanese, Taiwanese, or
German legal scholarship might instead encounter Schmitt due to the
growing interest in Western Marxism and critical theory. Various texts
translated between the early 1980s and 1990s, for example those of
Jürgen Habermas, made references to Schmitt’s incisive critiques of
liberalism in a manner that many Chinese intellectuals during the early
Reform period would have been likely to find intriguing. 152
Meanwhile, the conservative critique of excessive liberal
reformism as “political romanticism” was also one that emerged on
both sides of the Strait during the 1980s. By the end of the decade,
extensive debate about the desirable scope of political and social
transformation in China had generated not only official Party warnings
against “bourgeois liberalization,” but also intellectuals who sought to
provide State authority with a firmer set of theoretical justifications visa-vis the emerging force of civil society. Two such scholars active
during the 1980s and 1990s bear special mention. The first, Wang
Huning 王沪宁 (b. 1955), completed graduate study at Shanghai’s
Fudan University between 1977-1981, writing a thesis on the topic of
Id.
See, e.g. 于尔根·哈贝马斯 [Jürgen Habermas], 现代性:一项尚未完成
的事业 (下) [Modernity: An Unfinished Project (Part II)], 6 文艺研究 [LITERATURE &
ART STUD.] 153–56 (1994) (行远 [Xing Yuan] trans.). Translations from Lukacs,
Fredric Jameson, and others also contained brief references to Schmitt. Fredric
Jameson also mentioned Schmitt alongside Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as a great
figure of political theory during a guest lecture at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Institute of Foreign Literature in 1997. See, e.g. transcribed lecture in 弗雷
德里克·詹姆逊 [Fredric Jameson], 后现代主义中的旧话重提 [Repetition in
Postmodernism], 华中师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) (J. CENTRAL CHINA
NORMAL U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.) 6 (1997).
151
152
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sovereignty in Western thought “from Bodin to Maritain,”
subsequently published as the 1987 book State Sovereignty.153 Choosing
the French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) as the
endpoint of his study was intended to reflect the way that modern
Western discourse had started to find ways to relativize and diminish
state sovereignty precisely as soon as this concept became the basis for
claims to equality by non-Western states. Wang argued that the
“natural law” thinking on which arguments for limited sovereignty
were based in Maritain’s thought represented a new kind of “divine
right” for the bourgeois class.154
After becoming a professor at his alma mater in 1981 (where
he would rise to become the Director of the Department of
International Politics and later Dean of the Law Faculty), Wang
continued in numerous writings throughout the 1980s and 1990s to
advocate a critical skepticism of Western claims regarding liberal
democracy and universal values. These were tools, Wang argued, for
the West to deprive developing states of their autonomy.155 In his
work, Wang cited extensively to twentieth century theorists of
international law and politics, such as Kenneth Waltz, E. H. Carr, as
well as Schmitt-adjacent figures like Hans Kelsen, Hans Morgenthau,
and others. However, he does not seem to have cited to Schmitt
specifically. Nonetheless, his arguments for sovereignty as a defense
for civilizational pluralism, and against liberal universalism, closely
overlap with Schmitt’s ideas. This is especially significant because of
Wang’s post-academic trajectory. By the mid-1990s, he was a key figure
in the Communist Party’s Policy Research Office, where he rose
quickly and is credited with being the driving force behind the major
ideological initiatives of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. 156 In
2017, he attained the highest rank in China’s political system by
entering the Politburo Standing Committee, technically ranked fifth in

王沪宁 [WANG HUNING], 国家主权 [STATE SOVEREIGNTY ] (1985).
Id.
155
王沪宁 [Wang Huning], 论现当代主权理论的新发展 [On the
Development of Modern Theories of Sovereignty], 1 政治学研究 [CASS J. POL. SCI.] 39–45
(1985).
156
See, e.g. Haig Patapan and Yi Wang, The Hidden Ruler: Wang Huning and the
Making of Contemporary China, 27 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 47, 47–60 (2018).
153
154
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the Party’s ruling hierarchy. Today, he is the single official with the
most extensive direct authority over China’s political ideology.
While Wang and other supporters of Party rule on partially
non-Marxist grounds did not explicitly tie their arguments to
Schmittian thought, some parallels have grown more apparent over
time. This is perhaps most apparent in the work of Xiao Gongqin 萧
功秦 (b. 1946). Xiao began teaching political theory at Shanghai
Normal University in 1982, and over the course of the 1980s was
another one of the leaders in developing a perspective that would come
to be referred to as “neo-authoritarianism” (xinquanweizhuyi 新权威主
义) or “neo-conservativism” (xinbaoshouzhuyi 新保守主义).157 In
essence, Xiao’s position was that the concrete economic and cultural
conditions of Chinese society made sudden radical transformations
towards political modernity dangerous and certain to fail. By the late1980s, he, like Wu Geng in Taiwan, had firmly associated this “realist”
conservative position with an opposition to political “romanticism.”158
For a realist, state-led development would have to come first to achieve
national strength and prosperity, political reforms only well after.
In a 2001 book titled Farewell to Political Romanticism,159 he
recounts the occasion at an academic conference in Beidaihe, Hebei
Province, in August 1988 when he first articulated in a comprehensive
way his opposition to romantic political reform projects:
[at the Beidaihe meeting] I suggested that because
China did not have a sufficiently powerful middle class,
萧功秦 [Xiao Gongqin], 新保守主义能否成为左右之争外第三种选
择 [Can Neo-Conservatism Become the Third Way Beyond Left and Right?], 爱思想
[AISIXIANG] (October 13, 2011) (noting that neo-conservatism seeks to, inter alia,
“guide the development of the market economy via the means of political stability [
通过政治稳定，来引导市场经济的发展]”). See also 大陸「新保守主義」的崛
起——採訪蕭功秦 [The Rise of the Mainland’s ‘Neo-Conservatism’: An Interview with Xiao
Gongqin], 中國時報周刊 [CHINA TIMES WEEKLY] 4–5, (1992).
158
蕭功秦 [Xiao Gongqin], 論當前中國浪漫主義改革觀——對制度決
定論的批評 [On Contemporary Romantic Reformism in China: A Critique of the Theory of
System-Determinacy] in 現代社會與知識份子 [MODERN SOCIETY AND
INTELLECTUALS] (梁从诚 [Liang Congcheng] ed., 1989).
159
蕭功秦 [XIAO GONGQIN], 与政治浪漫主义告别 [FAREWELL TO
POLITICAL ROMANTICISM] (2001).
157
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it did not have its own internal motive force of
modernization, and so in these historical conditions,
after the Xinhai Revolution (the overthrow of the Qing
Dynasty) the parliamentary regime that was established
was a “rootless” politics. It was not based on China’s
own internal needs, but rather on the effect of norms
emanating from the West. Because the Western-style
political system was not able to effectively cohere the
primitive social formation, it brought about ever more
severe political crises and anomie, eventually leading to
the strongman Yuan Shikai’s usurpation of power.160
As Xiao would write in 1989, “in an environment that lacks full
development of autonomous personality and contract-based
interpersonal relationships, ‘pulling up sprouts to make them grow’
into a pluralistic democratic system is simply another sort of attempt
at ‘transition amidst poverty’ (qiong guodu 穷过渡).”161 Just as the mass
democracy movement was beginning to swell and then collapse under
the force of the Party’s backlash, Xiao was developing his “neoauthoritarian” view that it was necessary for the state to “use its ‘visible
hand’ to create the ‘invisible hand’” in creating the social conditions
for economic growth.162
The emerging ethos of state-led but market-oriented
developmentalism built upon the reception of Western economic ideas
that had increasingly permeated the intelligentsia and officialdom
during the 1980s. Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and other such
economic thinkers were being discussed with great interest, if not (until
much later, and even then only for a specific intellectual faction) as
generally embraced gurus of objective economic expertise.163
Id. at 5–7.
Xiao, supra note 158. The phrase “transition amidst poverty” refers to the
by then rejected notion, associated with the high-Maoism of the Cultural Revolution,
that it was not necessary to focus on economic development before seeking to realize
a Communist society.
162
Xiao, supra note 159 at 7.
163
See discussion in JULIAN GEWIRTZ, UNLIKELY PARTNERS: CHINESE
REFORMERS, WESTERN ECONOMISTS , AND THE MAKING OF GLOBAL CHINA,
Conclusion, FN35 (2017).
160
161
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Importantly, the freeing of the economy—and even, within
specified bounds, of the individual as a member of society—need not
signify bestowing forms of “freedom” that would challenge the Party.
Although such views were developing in official and intellectual circles
throughout the 1980s, the emergence of “neo-authoritarianism” as an
intervention in broader public discourse occurred via the January 16,
1989 World Economic Herald editorial of Wu Jiaxiang 吳稼祥 (b.
1955), an economist who had worked at the Central Committee’s
General Office among other Party positions. In this editorial, Wu
opens by noting that “as some more sensitive individuals might have
already noticed, there is a strange fairy beating its wings through the
forest of the intelligentsia, and it is called neo-authoritarianism.”164
According to Wu, this specter is “new” because:
It does not seek to strip individuals of their freedom as
the basis for establishing an autocratic authority, rather
it uses authority to dissolve the obstacles to the
development of individual freedom and in order to
guarantee individual freedom. To deprive or to
guarantee individual freedom is the dividing line
between the old and the new forms of authoritarianism
. . . on the one hand, it allows individual freedom to
develop, on the other hand, it uses the necessary
centralization of power to maintain the social stability
needed for freedom to develop.”165
In the editorial, Wu notes Wang Huning along with a few other
scholars as leading pioneers of neo-authoritarianism. In a later
retrospective, he would also note Xiao Gongqin’s important role. 166 As
吳稼祥 [Wu Jiaxiang], 新權威主義述評 [Explanation and Commentary on
Neo-Authoritarianism], 世界經濟導報 [WORLD ECON. HERALD] (Jan. 16, 1989).
165
Id.
166
吳稼祥 [Wu Jiaxiang], 1989年:《新权威主义述评》引发激烈争论
[1989: ‘Explanation and Commentary on Neo-Authoritarianism’ Sparks an Intense Debate],
爱思想 [AI SIXIANG] (2008). Wu also notes the interesting detail that shortly after
the editorial was released, sparking widespread and often acrimonious debate, Wang
Huning gave him a call from abroad to ask him what was transpiring. Also important
to the early development of neo-authoritarianism was Rong Jian 荣剑 (1957- ) (who
had become a critic of the idea by January 1989), and the influence of Samuel
Huntington’s writings on state-led development in Asia. Id.
164
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Xiao wrote subsequently in 1989, politics and economics would “have
to be separated,”167 and indeed Wu later summarized the basic point
of his editorial as being that “economic freedom must take priority
over democratic politics.”168 Xiao, Wang, Wu, and others in the PRC
continued developing their new forms of statist developmentalism at
the same time as sometimes overlapping conversations on
development and modernization were being held in Taiwan,169 and
Xiao, for instance, became personally involved in cross-Strait activities.
They and other neo-authoritarians were essentially committed to the
idea of developmentalist autocracy—a state that can justifiably limit
civil and political rights, as well as social and economic guarantees, for
the purposes of modernization and overall development. This, of
course, matches very well with the PRC’s actual policies since the
beginning of the Deng Era in 1978. As Xiao would write in 2001:
Neo-authoritarianism viewed objectively has the effect
of using the ‘visible hand’ of authoritarian politics to
create the ‘invisible hand’ and market economy, and
ultimately to spur the fundamental transformation of
the social structure, creating the social and economic
foundations needed in order to establish a genuine,
rooted democratic politics. [ . . . ] My conclusion was
that, although this neo-authoritarianism had a certain
degree of risk of degenerating back into traditional
authoritarianism, nonetheless it could not be
disregarded as a realistic alternative option in

Xiao, supra note 158.
Wu, supra note 166.
169
See, e.g. 葛克昌 [Ge Kechang], 國家與社會二元論及其憲法意義 [State
and Society Dualism and its Constitutional Meaning], 臺大法學論叢 [NAT’L TAIWAN U.
L. J.] (1994); 蕭高彥 [Xiao Gaoshen], 馬基維利論政治秩序: 個形上學的考察
[Machiavelli on Political Order: A Metaphysical Investigation], 9 政治科學論叢
[TAIWANESE J. POL. SCI.] 145–72 (1998) (citing Schmitt’s Political Theology and Wu
Geng’s interpretation of Schmitt for the view that anthropological assumptions, for
example, about mankind’s inherent good or evil, underlie political projects).
167
168
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comparison with the unrealistic political romanticism
of ‘virtual democracy’ [xuni minzhu zhengzhi].170
Not coincidentally, Wang Huning’s first great contribution to
Communist Party ideology, the “Three Represents” theory proclaimed
by Jiang Zemin in 2002, would assert that the Party’s legitimacy was
premised on its representation of “advanced social productive forces,”
“advanced culture,” and “the fundamental interests of the majority.”171
That is, the Party’s status as the agent of modernization and
development of state, economy, and society (rather than socioeconomic egalitarian redistribution) was given a firm political basis.
Party policy has since continued to evince a path closely resembling
(but not explicitly endorsing) the “neo-authoritarian” vision of
progressively greater freeing of markets while maintaining tight control
of all political discourse.
Although these most influential neo-authoritarian voices did
not explicitly embrace Schmitt, they helped create a climate in which
others began to cite him favorably for related ideas. Particularly notable
is a 1995 article on “The Political Function of the Modern State” that
appeared in the journal Comparative Economic & Social Systems.172 The
author, Wang Lie 王列, was affiliated with the Party’s Compilation and
Translation Bureau (Zhongyang Bianyizu 中央编译局) (“CCTB”).
Before its eventual merger into another Party body in 2018, the CCTB
was responsible for the study and translation of important theoretical
texts, including the reception of Western Marxism. It also functioned
as a think tank generating policy proposals.
Wang Lie’s article concerns different ways of conceiving of
state authority and, in particular, the state’s function as a coercive
regulator of society. Over the course of a few pages, Wang introduces
relevant views on state power from a number of Western theorists,
including Althusser, Max Weber, Schmitt, Julien Freund, Michel
170
Xiao, supra note 158. In the same section of the book, Xiao also criticizes
the attempt to establish “virtual parliamentary democracy” in Third World states
unprepared for the importation of parliamentary institutions.
171
See Patapan and Wang, supra note 156.
172
王列 [Wang Lie], 现代国家的政治职能 [The Political Function of the
Modern State], 经济社会体制比较 [COMP. ECON. & SOC. SYS.] 2 (1995).
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Foucault, and others. Schmitt’s ideas are presented as a continuation
of Weber’s theorization of the state as the holder of a “monopoly of
legitimate violence.” By reference to Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and
Friend-Enemy distinction, Wang argues that this conception of politics
helps to clarify the distinction of state’s distinctive political existence
from its qualities as an economic or social actor. Nonetheless, he
ultimately argues that it is Foucault’s thought which holds the most
useful insights for contemporary China. By reference to Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, he argues that it is important
for Chinese to realize that the state is no longer primarily an agent of
violent coercion. Rather, in the modern age the state can more
effectively make use of “thought control and techniques of
surveillance” to achieve its political ends.173 In post-1989 China, this
suggestion actually carried overtones of moderate reformism.
The same year, Schmitt also appears in a brief list of
“important legal theorists” of the twentieth century in an article by
China University of Politics and Law professor Shu Guoying.174
Overall, however, explicit engagement with Schmitt’s ideas in PRC
scholarship remained extremely marginal throughout most of the
1980s-1990s. As a demonstration, in 1988 Schmitt was cursorily
included (as “Karl Schmidt”) in the China Practical Legal Studies
Dictionary.175 The paragraph-long entry runs as follows:
施米特 [Schmitt] 1888–? Karl Schmidt
German fascist political and legal theorist, educator,
and lawyer. Received his education in Berlin, Munich,
Strasbourg, and other universities. After graduating
was an instructor at universities in Greifswald, Bonn,
Cologne, and Berlin. Between 1933-1945 he was a
member of the Prussian State Council, and the editor
in chief of the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung. He was arrested
Id.
舒国滢 [Shu Guoying], 赫伯特·L·A·哈特:一代法哲学大师的陨
落 [Herbert L.A. Hart: The Passing of a Great Legal Philosopher] (vol. no.) 研究生法学
[GRAD. L. REV.] (1995).
175
中华实用法学大辞典 [CHINA PRACTICAL LEGAL STUDIES
DICTIONARY] (栗劲 [Li Jin] and 李放 [Li Fang] et al. eds., 1988).
173
174
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after the end of the Second World War, and released in
1947. He advocated state monopoly and actively
supported the fascist ascent to power. He was a loyal
believer in Hitler’s National Socialism. Already before
the fascists rose to power, he had used criticism of the
Weimar Republic’s governing system to advertise
totalitarianism and oppose bourgeois democracy. In
order to serve the fascist regime, he published a series
of essays, in particular on the so-called Führerprinzip.
His major works include Dictatorship (1921), The Crisis
of Parliamentary Democracy (1926), The Concept of the
Political (1927), Constitutional Theory (1928), State,
Movement, People (1933), and On the Three Types of Juristic
Thought, etc.
Almost the exact same entry on Schmitt (down to the incorrect
spelling and failure to notice his death in 1985) was reprinted nine years
later in an entry in the China Law Dictionary, produced by the official
press of the Chinese People’s Procuratorate (Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe
中国检察出版社).176 Despite the overlaps between the new “neoauthoritarian” ideas and Schmitt’s thought, at this point officiallysanctioned government texts still dismissed him in a manner similar to
his treatment in Liu Shaoqi’s 1949 volume on internationalism and in
Li Jiashan’s early 1980s mentions. Even as the 1997 reference work
was being published, however, a new movement towards intensive
engagement with Schmitt was beginning to take hold.
B. Strong State and Sound Economy
A significant watershed for open reception of Schmitt’s
thought in the PRC came with advocacy of his ideas by Liu Xiaofeng
(刘小枫) (b. 1956), a professor of cultural and political theory at
Renmin University in Beijing. After completing undergraduate studies
in German language and literature in his home province Sichuan, Liu
began Ph.D. studies in theology with the Swiss theologian Heinrich
Ott at the University of Basel in 1989, graduating four years later with

孙国华 [SUN GUOHUA], 中华法学大辞典法理学卷 [CHINA LAW
DICTIONARY: JURISPRUDENCE] (1997).
176
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a thesis on the phenomenology of Max Scheler.177 Between 1993-2002,
he was affiliated as a researcher with the Chinese University of Hong
Kong’s Institute of Chinese Studies.178 It was during this period in
Hong Kong that Liu’s interests in politics and theology, and his
skepticism of cultural universalism, led him to engage with Schmitt’s
ideas as well as those of Leo Strauss.179 In 1998, Liu published the
article “Carl Schmitt and the Predicament of Liberal
Constitutionalism,” in a Hong Kong-based journal.180 This piece, a
response to John P. McCormick’s book Carl Schmitt’s Critique of
Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology, marked the beginning of a phase
during which Liu would emphatically advocate Schmitt’s ideas.181
Already in 1999, he led a seminar series at Peking University in which
he sought to convince his elite academic audience of Schmitt’s status
as the most recent giant of the Western political theory canon.
Over the next several years, Liu wrote a number of pieces on
Schmitt’s thought and its relationship to modern China. In 2002, he
edited a volume of essays on Carl Schmitt and Political Law,182 and also
wrote articles on Schmitt and modernity,183 Schmitt’s theory of the
partisan and valorization of Maoism,184 and other topics. Liu’s
idiosyncratic personal views as both a self-described “cultural
Christian” and a zealous advocate for the importance of Mao Zedong
and his thought (opposing the official characterization of the Cultural
See introduction and overview of Liu’s early academic career in LIU
XIAOFENG, SINO -THEOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: A COLLECTION
OF ESSAYS BY LIU XIAOFENG, 1–24 (Leopold Leeb ed., 2015). See also discussion in
Kroll, supra note 4.
178
Id.
179
Id. A critical appraisal of Liu’s uses of Strauss is presented in Marchal and
Shaw, supra note 4.
180
刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施米特与自由主义宪政理论的困境 [Carl
Schmitt and the Predicament of Liberal Constitutionalism], 6 二十一世紀 [TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY] (1998).
181
Liu notes, for example, that McCormick fails to take “deeply engage with
the Hegelian background to Schmitt’s Political Romanticism.” Id.
182
施米特與政治法學 [CARL SCHMITT AND POLITICAL LAW] (刘小枫
[Liu Xiaofeng] ed., 2002).
183
刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施密特与政治哲学的现代性 [Schmitt and the
Modernity of Political Philosophy], 浙江学刊 [ZHEJIANG ACAD. J.] (2001).
184
刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施米特与游击队理论 [Schmitt’s Theory of the
Partisan], 爱思想 [AI SIXIANG], (2005).
177
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Revolution as an unmitigated error), both would seem to put him at
the fringes of PRC intelligentsia. Yet his scholarly arguments were
framed in terms highly compatible with the rising state
developmentalist ethos being promoted in official discourse and by
“neo-authoritarians.”
Echoing Xiao Gongqin’s reflections on China’s constitutional
history, Liu in 2005 wrote that China’s reformist intellectuals during
the Republic of China period had been unrealistic and incapable of
perceiving the reality of the society they were trying to create laws for.
He found it particularly remarkable that Zhang Junmai could have
spent so much time in Weimar Germany without encountering
Schmitt’s anti-liberal views.185 Liu does not, however, seem to have
read the rather forgotten 1932 article on the “State Crisis of the
Chinese Republic,” cited supra, in which Zhang does in fact (if briefly)
cite and engage with Schmitt’s thought.186
Like Yao in the 1930s, Liu also has a longstanding interest in
Hegelian philosophy of history and the idea that China’s modern
politics reflect something like the “movement of spirit” through
historical events that create self-aware national subjects. This is
reflected in writings both before and after his turn to Schmitt.187 In
works on the history of both Chinese and Western political thought,
Liu has advanced his views regarding the untranslatability of AngloAmerican rule of law-based liberalism to other cultural contexts. His
interest in Schmitt is paired with complementary appreciation for the
critical positions to be read in the works of Leo Strauss, Thomas
Hobbes, and Han Feizi (whose thought similarly struck both Xu

刘小枫 [LIU XIAOFENG], 现代人及其敌人—公法学家施米特引论
[MODERN MAN AND HIS ENEMY: INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW SCHOLAR CARL
SCHMITT] 240-70 (2005).
186
See supra note 61.
187
E.g., in 刘小枫 [LIU XIAOFENG], 圣灵降临的叙事 [THE STORY OF
THE COMING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT] (2003). In this book, Liu provides his
interpretation of the “spirit” (Geist / jingshen 精神) that is so important to Hegel’s
philosophy of history, and argues inter alia that Chinese history presents analogous
developments of “spirit”—specifically in the sense of a dialectical progression of
group subjectivity through a series of advancing political forms—to that which Hegel
sees in the West.
185
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Daolin and Wu Geng as a valuable resource for the critique of
reductive liberal prescriptivism).
Liu’s late 1990s and early 2000s writings on Schmitt were
joined by those of various others developing an interest in non-Marxist
critiques of liberalism (as well as liberals who noticed with alarm the
sudden upsurge of interest in an arch-conservative figure).188 Not all of
the political theorists and (particularly) legal scholars who began to
discuss Schmitt’s ideas at this point were inspired by Liu’s Schmittian
evangelism. The evolution of the Party’s ideology (with Wang Huning
at the forefront) and its overall policies combining continued
repression of alternative political voices with ever more committed
statist developmentalism (reflected in particular in the extensive stateled efforts to ensure successful World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
entry in 2000), ensured that conditions were ripe for anyone seeking to
theorize the legitimacy of a “strong state and sound economy.”189
Some uses of Schmitt during this period were, however,
articulated as more searching critiques of China’s policy direction since
Opening Up. The “New Left” historian and political theorist Wang
Hui 汪晖 (b. 1958) of Tsinghua University was a prominent early
representative of such discourse. He has particularly criticized China’s
“depoliticization” in the Reform Era, as important social issues and
state policies have been removed from the scope of possible discourse
and contestation. In 2006, for example, he argues that “for reasons of
development and social stability, the space for political debate has
largely been eliminated[, t]he party is no longer an organization with
specific political values, but is a structured organization of power. Even

188
张小劲 [ZHANG XIAOJIN] and 景跃进 [JING YUEJIN], 比较政治学导
论 [INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS], 121, 250 (2001) (citing Schmitt’s
The Concept of the Political for the “most extreme variant” of a realist view considering
politics as “the struggle for survival of the state.”); see also, e.g. 何包钢 [He Baogang],
保卫程序:一个自由主义者对卡尔·施密特例外理论的批评
[Defending
Procedure: A Liberal’s Critique of Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Exception], 2 浙江学
[ZHEJIANG ACAD. J.] (2002).
189
Cf. Carl Schmitt, “Starker Staat und Gesunde Wirtschaft: Ein Vortrag vor
Wirtschaftsführern” (Lecture of 23 Nov. 1932) in Maschke supra note 11.
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within the party it is not easy to carry out real political debate.”190 This
is a state of affairs that characterizes the West as well. Indeed, he
argues, it should be seen as endemic to liberalism qua ethos of an
international order premised on free market political economy.
Specifically referring to Schmitt’s 1929 essay “The Age of
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” as an inspiration, Wang notes
that:
Schmitt, for whom the central practical political
problem in the 1920s was the containment of the rising
power of the working class, sought a new form of
relationship between the political and the economic,
neither laissez-faire nor social-democratic. The
unsystematic interpenetration of the political and the
economic during the 1920s was, from this perspective,
a mistake and a danger. Schmitt’s concept of
“neutralization,” although specific to Western
intellectual and political history, could have utility in
other contexts.191
Wang’s work is characterized by these sorts of occasional
deployments of Schmitt’s concepts as a source for insights related to
modern Chinese political history. This approach is on display, for
instance, in his 2010 review of the Chinese translation of Lydia Liu’s
Clash of Empires.192 Wang notes that Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty
sets up key assumptions underlying Liu’s analysis: namely, how
liberalism’s ostensibly neutral doctrine of the state as “equate[d] with
pure legal processes,” ignores the political essence of the sovereign
state in its actual concrete relationship to society.193 In the same essay,
Wang notes how Japan’s experience with international law was
particularly instructive regarding these themes. On this point, he recites
190
Wang Hui, Depoliticized Politics, Multiple Components of Hegemony, and the
Eclipse of the Sixties, 7 INTER‐ ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 683, 686 (2006) (Christopher
Connery trans.).
191
Id. (citing Carl Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929)
in 96 TELOS 130–142 (Summer 1993) (G. L. Ulmen trans.).
192
Wang Hui, 帝国的冲突，或帝国时代的冲突? [Clash of Empires or
Clashes of the Imperialist Age?], 读书 [DU SHU] 1 (2010).
193
Id.
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the anecdote that members of the Japanese Iwakura mission to Europe
(1871-1873) had initially believed that international law was treated as
a genuinely binding code similar to domestic laws—until Otto von
Bismarck explained to them that sovereign states were not, in the end,
constrained by legal norms they did not choose to obey.194
Understanding the systematic nature of the sovereign state’s
self-definition as a kind of free agent able to exploit and conquer lessdeveloped peoples is, for Wang, a crucial aspect of understanding the
crisis China has endured since being suddenly confronted with a world
full of such actors over the course of the nineteenth century. It is in
this context as well, that China faced (and still faces) its own task of
“defining its boundaries” as a traditional empire or civilization not
reducible to a Westphalian state.195 Schmitt’s thought is, for Wang, a
useful launching point for reflections that tend to arrive not at any
particular set of prescriptions, but rather at open-ended questions
about China’s identity in the face of an alienating modernity and
exploitative global markets.196
Liu Xiaofeng and Wang Hui’s different approaches to Schmitt
can be viewed as continuing a theme that has been apparent since his
earliest reception by Chinese intellectuals. His critiques can be taken as
either justifications for the total power of the state and the elimination
of challenges from civil society (as both Yao Baoxian and Liu Xiaofeng
seem to suggest) or, alternatively, as articulating dissatisfaction with
both the possibilities afforded by Western liberalism and with China’s
own failures to independently develop a system capable of achieving
specific political goods. Wang employs Schmittian ideas to support his
questioning as to why key policies, such as economic distribution,
should be taken out of the space of political contestation. Part of the
explanation for the degree of Chinese attention to Schmitt’s thought is
undoubtedly this “double-edged sword” quality—it can be used either
to legitimate existing power systems as reflecting a given society’s
Id.
Id.
196
Wang’s four-volume series on “The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought”
(Xiandai Zhongguo Sixiang de Xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起) similarly delves into these
questions of China’s civilizational identity and capacity to define its own politics as
well as cultural Weltanschauung.
194
195
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concrete order, or, alternatively, as the basis for calls to transform them
to better match that order.
In 2002, alongside Liu Xiaofeng’s first edited book on Schmitt,
a separate translation of several of Schmitt’s writings (including The
Concept of the Political) was included in a collection entitled Schmitt: The
Surplus Value of the Political.197 The following year, Liu edited a collection
titled The Concept of the Political, that included translations of the
eponymous work as well as Legality and Legitimacy, Political Theology,
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, and Political Theology II.198 From this
point, translation of Schmitt’s work in the PRC picked up rapidly, and
his thought could be said to have “gone mainstream” in Chinese legal
and political scholarship. A partial list includes: A 2004 translation of
Political Romanticism paired with The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,199
which was shortly followed by Constitutional Theory (2005),200 Land and
Sea (2006),201 Positions and Concepts: In Combat with Weimar, Geneva,
Versailles (1923-1939) (2006),202 The Guardian of the Constitution (2008),203
The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (2008),204 On the Three
Types of Juristic Thought (2012);205 revised editions of Legality and
197
施米特:政治的剩余价值 [SCHMITT: THE SURPLUS VALUE OF THE
POLITICAL] (舒炜 [Shu Wei] ed., 2002).
198
政治的概念 [THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL ] (刘小枫 [Liu
Xiaofeng] ed., 2003).
199
CARL SCHMITT, 政治的浪漫派 [POLITICAL ROMANTICISM], (冯克利
[Feng Keli] ed. and 刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2004).
200
CARL SCHMITT, 宪法学说 [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] (刘锋 [Liu
Feng] trans., 2005).
201
CARL SCHMITT, 陆地与海洋: 古今之”法”变 [LAND AND SEA:
ANCIENT AND MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF “LAW”] (林国基 [Lin Guoji] and
周敏 [Zhou Min] trans., 2006).
202
CARL SCHMITT, 论断与概念: 在与魏玛, 日内瓦, 凡尔赛的斗争
中 [POSITIONS AND CONCEPTS : IN COMBAT WITH WEIMAR, GENEVA, VERSAILLES]
(朱雁冰 [Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2006).
203
CARL SCHMITT, 宪法的守护者 [THE GUARDIAN OF THE
CONSTITUTION], (李君韬 [Li Juntao] and 苏慧婕 [Su Huijie] eds., 2008).
204
CARL SCHMITT, 霍布斯国家学说中的利维坦:一个政治符号的意义
及其失败 [THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES:
MEANING AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL] (应星 [Ying Xing] and 朱雁冰
[Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2008).
205
CARL SCHMITT, 论法学思维的三种模式 [ON THE THREE TYPES OF
JURISTIC THOUGHT], (苏慧婕 [Su Huijie] ed., 2012).
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Legitimacy (2015),206 Political Theology (2015),207 The Concept of the Political
(paired with The Theory of the Partisan) (2015),208 Constitutional Theory,209
and Political Romanticism (2016).210 Most recently, The Nomos of the Earth
(2017), was translated for the first time.211
V. ONGOING DEBATES
A. Authoritarian “Seduction”?
As noted, some PRC scholars in the Reform Era were aware
of Schmitt’s work, even citing him favorably before Liu Xiaofeng’s
essays and seminars started to generate increasing attention of Schmitt.
Some came to such awareness via familiarity with contemporary
Taiwanese, Japanese, or German legal scholarship (or with the growing
number of works on Schmitt in the English language during the 19801990s). As the Shandong University law professor Li Daogang wrote
in a 2003 review of Liu’s edited collection on Carl Schmitt and Political
Law, by the time Li visited Germany for his studies in the late 1980s
Schmitt’s name already “filled the ears like thunder.” 212 The late 1990s
also featured accelerated translation and commentary on works of
Western critical theory which appeared in officially-endorsed Party
publications like the journal Marxism and Reality of the Central
Compilation & Translation Bureau’s Institute for Contemporary
206
CARL SCHMITT, 合法性与正当性 [LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY] (冯克
利 [Feng Keli], 李秋零 [Li Qiuling] and 朱雁冰 [Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2015).
207
CARL SCHMITT, 政治的神学 [POLITICAL THEOLOGY ] (刘宗坤 [Liu
Zongkun], 吴增定 [Wu Zengding] et al. trans., 2015).
208
CARL SCHMITT, 政治的概念 [THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL] (刘宗
坤 [Liu Zongkun], 朱雁冰等 [Zhu Yanbing] et al. trans., 2015).
209
CARL SCHMITT, 宪法学说:修订译本 [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
REVISED TRANSLATION] (刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2015).
210
CARL SCHMITT, 政治的浪漫派 [POLITICAL ROMANTICISM] (冯克利
[Feng Keli] and 刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2016).
211
CARL SCHMITT, 大地的法 [THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM] (刘毅 [Liu Yi] and 张陈果
[Zhang Chenguo] trans., 2017).
212
李道刚 [Li Daogang], 浪漫国家主义批判:《施米特与政治法学》
漫谈 [A Critique of Romantic Statism: Discussing Carl Schmitt and Political Law], 山东大
学法律评论 [SHANDONG U. L. REV.], 360–63 (2003).
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Marxism (Zhongyang Bianyiju Dangdai Makesizhuyi Yanjiusuo 中央编译
局当代马克思主义研究所), and Schmitt’s name and some of his
ideas could also be encountered in such works.213 Thus, while Liu has
certainly influenced Schmitt’s overall reception and clearly done much
to draw attention to his ideas, it would be an exaggeration to say that
Chinese readers of Schmitt are necessarily following Liu’s
interpretations.214 This is especially important to keep in mind when
evaluating the practical dimensions of Schmitt reception in China over
the last two decades, i.e., the active debates in which his authority is
cited as the basis for specific positions.
Broadly speaking, Schmitt’s thought, since roughly 2000, has
been deployed primarily (as was the case ever since its earliest
receptions in China) as a prophylactic against wholesale liberalism and
“Westernization,” as well as its legal manifestation of “judicialization”
(sifahua 司法化) of essentially political issues.215 It has only secondarily
been the basis for positive political prescriptions or even for more
comprehensive projects of critique. This is apparent when taking into
account two aspects of the Schmitt reception. The first is its status as
in significant part a reaction against the (until recently) much more
dominant reception in Chinese academia of Anglo-American liberal

Brief discussions of Schmitt’s views on politics as friend/enemy relations
are found in, e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 兽性与人性: 一场法律与道德边界上的战
争 [Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border Between Law and Morality] 读书 [DU
SHU] 9 (刘慧儒 [Liu Huiru] trans., 1999) (translation of Jürgen Habermas, Bestialität
und Humanität: Ein Krieg an der Grenze zwischen Recht und Moral, DIE ZEIT (Apr.
29,1999); JÜRGEN HABERMAS and 歧人 [QIREN], 还有选择 [There Are Still
Alternatives], (vol. no.) 马克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] 2 (1999)
(translation of Habermas, Es gibt doch Alternativen!, DIE ZEIT (Aug.10, 1998
(interview)); see also 张汝伦 [Zhang Rulun], 哈贝马斯和帝国主义 [Habermas and
Imperialism], 9 读书 [DU SHU] 34–42 (1999) (contrasting Schmitt’s “anthropological
pessimism” and views about “bestial human nature” with the anthropological
optimism of Habermas).
214
For an especially distinct set of readings, see those of Gao Quanxi and
Zheng Qi, noted infra.
215
The issue of “judicialization” is taken in both the general sense, of
removing issues from the political sphere and turning them into matters for
technocratic administration by agencies and courts, and also in the specific sense of
turning the political principles of the Constitution, in particular, into AngloAmerican style judiciable constitutional norms.
213
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thinkers such as John Rawls.216 The second (related) aspect is the
overall conservative (rather than radically innovative) argumentation it
has tended to produce regarding legal issues, in particular problems of
constitutional interpretation.
That Schmitt is often deployed in a defensive mode might be
best apparent from some of the early liberal reactions to his nascent
popularity in the early 2000s. The ECNU political scientist Wu
Guanjun 吴冠军 (b. 1976), for example, wrote a 2003 essay for Open
Times, the prestigious and officially-sanctioned journal of the
Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, attacking Schmitt’s Concept of
the Political and other writings as failing to grasp the true content of
legitimacy.217 He cites Habermas, Hans Blumenberg, Hayek, and Rawls
for their richer and more “optimistic” accounts of political
legitimacy.218
Liberal reactions have often turned on the premise that some
value may be present in Schmitt’s critical perspectives, but that he
should prevented from achieving a place of ideological guiding
authority similar to that of Mill, Rawls, or Hayek.219 Gong Renren 龚
刃韧 (b. 1954), an influential legal scholar based at Peking University,
is one recent example. In a 2015 editorial for the UK’s Financial Times
Chinese-language edition regarding “a bizarre phenomenon I have
personally witnessed in Chinese universities,” 220 Gong articulated his
dismay with the use of Schmitt’s ideas to support a “statist” agenda of
privileging sovereign power over individual rights or international
norms. While purely academic studies of the thinker should be
tolerated per the principle of “allowing a hundred schools of thought
On Rawls’s many Reform Era Chinese readers, see, e.g. SAMULI
SEPPÄNEN, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA: USEFUL PARADOXES 125–28, 149 (2016).
217
吴冠军 [Wu Guanjun], 现实与正当之间—论施米特的《政治的概
念》[Between Reality and Legitimacy: On Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political], 开放时代
[OPEN TIMES] (2003).
218
Id.
219
Of course, these figures are “guides” primarily only for avowedly liberal
scholars.
220
龚刃韧 [Gong Renren], 中国大学目睹之怪现状 [A Bizarre Phenomenon
I Have Personally Witnessed in Chinese Universities], FT中文网 [FIN TIMES CHINESE ED.]
(June 3, 2015).
216
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to contend,” it would be deeply worrying if Schmitt’s “pathological”
views were to directly influence state policy or infect Chinese society
more broadly.221 Some Chinese liberal scholars, like certain Western
counterparts, have thus portrayed any interest in Schmitt as an
inexplicable academic perversity.222
Others have instead sought in Schmitt’s thought a means by
which the contradictions of liberalism can be evaded, while its virtues
might be preserved. Such a project is of course not without its tensions.
In 2016, students of the Tsinghua constitutional law professor Lin
Laifan 林来梵 (b. 1963) collected a set of “50 Classic Classroom
Quotations by Professor Lin,” which he subsequently edited and
republished in an online legal periodical. Quotations 9 and 11 deal with
his concerns over what others were already referring to as “Schmitt
fever”223:
[Carl] Schmitt is really famous in today’s China. Many
political theorists, philosophers, and legal scholars pay
attention to him. They find his thinking very
persuasive, very profound, and one after another go
worship at his feet. You’d think he was wearing a dress
. . . If you have trouble resisting temptation, please
don’t casually approach Schmitt. That’s as dangerous
as letting a 16-year-old boy get close to a beautiful
seductress.224
Lin’s advice reflects his own engagement with the German
scholar. Ten years earlier, for example, he had already co-authored an
essay with Zheng Qi of ECNU, regarding Schmitt’s “theistic
conception of the constitution,”225 in which he acknowledged the
power of critiques that revealed the inability of legal norms to account
Id.
Mark Lilla, Reading Strauss in Beijing, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 16, 2010).
223
See supra note 5.
224
林来梵 [Lin Laifan], 清华大学教授林来梵: 50大经典语录 [Tsinghua
University Professor Lin Laifan: 50 Classic Quotations, 法律读库 [L. READERS] (Apr. 7,
2016).
225
林来梵 [Lin Laifan] and 郑琪 [Zheng Qi], 有神论的政治宪法学—对
施米特的解读 [Theistic Political Constitutionalism: Interpreting Carl Schmitt], 2 同济大学
学报(社会科学版) [J. TONGJI U. (SOC. SCI. SEC.)] 39–47 (2006).
221
222
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for exceptional situations. Even a legal system fully intended to deliver
the protection of individual freedoms and well-being would not be able
to supply those goods without, at times, a clear political decision being
taken by a state authority to prevent ambiguities and differences of
opinion.
Various other liberal-leaning academics had indeed already
begun by this early period to selectively incorporate aspects of
Schmitt’s critical views into their own work (while trying not to be
“seduced” by his illiberalism). Beihang University’s prominent
constitutional theorist Gao Quanxi 高全喜 (b. 1962), for example,
writing in the same year as Lin and Zheng also had to admit that
“Schmitt’s venomous sting,”226 while dangerous, was not without
certain meaningful contributions. Identifying gaps in traditional liberal
thought, or certain “hard problems” of political liberalization that had
afflicted the Weimar Republic and that could recur in other times and
places, was valuable. Schmitt’s discussions of the Weimar Constitution
could be instructive regarding the susceptibility to overthrow of fragile
legal systems without a firm basis in a concrete political consensus.
Gao also specifically notes Hayek’s engagement with Schmitt’s
constitutional thought in The Constitution of Liberty as a kind of seal of
approval indicating that liberals may, after all, find ideas worth
discussing in Schmitt’s oeuvre.227
Gao’s 2005 effort to understand the Schmitt phenomenon in
China was nonetheless limited—he derides the late works on
international law and politics The Nomos of the Earth, and Theory of the
Partisan, as “concoctions by which Schmitt degraded himself to an
absurd and laughable degree . . . seeking to overturn the great trends
of constitutional democracy and cosmopolitanism.”228 In Gao’s later
work, however, he has increasingly engaged with Schmitt’s ideas as a
way to define his own model of “political constitutionalism,” premised
(in his case) on the key institution of the development of a
representative assembly as a central feature of modern Chinese legal
高全喜 [Gao Quanxi], 中國語境下的施米特問題 [The Question of
Schmitt in Chinese Discourse], (vol. no.) 二十一世紀 [TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY] 95,
119–132 (June 2006).
227
Id. at 122–23.
228
Id. at 125.
226
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history.229 From the reluctant engagement on display in his 2005 essay,
he has since come to argue, often with specific reference to Schmitt’s
views, that “[i]f one cannot understand the history of existence,
revolution, state founding, constitution making [ . . . ] in the modern
China, one cannot understand the theoretical background of the
Chinese political constitutionalism [ . . . ] either.”230 Anglo-American
liberalism (at least in its Chinese reception) could be too simplistic in
providing prescriptions to establish a free and democratic legal order.
There remains the Schmittian problem of achieving a “politics of
transition” from the exception to the “normal situation,” which can
occur only via consensus of the popular sovereign.
B. Concrete Order, Political Form, and the Constitution
Gao’s version of political constitutionalism, with its focus on
the concrete conditions of a specific polity’s distribution of legitimate
political authority, stakes out one of the positions in a widespread and
influential debate over political constitutionalism that is increasingly
part of the mainstream of Chinese legal scholarship. Schmitt’s thought
plays a significant role in this trend. In essence, the scholarship of
political constitutionalism has developed via a distinction with judicial
constitutionalism, or the use of constitutional norms as the basis for
judicial review of and constraint upon government action. It has thus

229
See especially 高全喜 [GAO QUANXI], 从非常政治到日常政治 [FROM
EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS TO ORDINARY POLITICS] (2009). Here and in
subsequent works, Gao develops his own theory of political constitutionalism that is
intended to reflect a developing concrete political consensus (in the Schmittian sense)
for the “de-revolutionizing” of Chinese society and the end of the political state of
exception associated with direct Party-control. A useful overview of Gao’s ideas, and
their relationship with those of scholars advocating forms of Schmitt-influenced
political constitutionalism that instead favor direct Party rule, is in Albert H.Y. Chen,
The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Contemporary China: Gao Quanxi’s Studies on
China’s Political Constitution, 14 CHINA REV. 183, 183–214 (2014).
230
高全喜 [Gao Quanxi], 政治宪法学:政治宪法理论, 抑或政治立宪
主义? [The Jurisprudence of Political Constitution: Political Constitutional Theory or Political
Constitutionalism?], 清华大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [J. TSINGHUA U. (PHIL. &
SOC. SCI.)] 5 (page no.) (2015) (arguing that China’s Schmitt-influenced “value-free
constitutional studies” [emphasis in original] can be improved by seeking to define
“the Chinese road from the law of survival to the law of freedom”).
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been highly useful for scholars skeptical of Anglo-American style
separation of powers to turn to Schmitt as a resource for their critiques.
The current Chinese discourse of political constitutionalism
has developed in particular through the works of Chen Duanhong 陈
端洪 (b. 1966), Jiang Shigong 強世功 (b. 1967), Gao, and other legal
scholars. All participants in these debates share a basic premise
regarding the primacy of questions regarding the distribution of
political authority over the meaning and content of law. They differ,
however, regarding the actual location of the most authoritative
representative of the popular sovereign, or the agent capable of
articulating the “Decision” in Schmittian terms. While Gao has argued
at length that this agent is the National People’s Congress (following a
long history of attempts to establish a representative legislature), Chen
argues instead that this authority is shared between the NPC and the
Communist Party,231 with the latter taking precedence. China’s
constitutional order must be interpreted based on the concrete
characteristics of its guoti 国体,232 literally meaning “state body” but
also carrying implications related to a polity’s “concrete order”).233
Chen argues for five essential legal norms (or “fundamental
laws”: genben fa 根本法) of the Chinese political order that must be
used as the basis for constitutional interpretation: these are (1) “the
leadership of the Communist Party”; (2) “socialism”; (3) “democratic
centralism”; (4) “modernization”; and (5) “protection of basic
rights.”234 As the order of these norms suggests, individual rights (or
judicial attempts to enforce those rights) must be subordinated to the
Party’s role as “leader” and the core policies articulating the national
will and delivering modernization and development. Chen went on to
陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 宪法学的知识界碑—政治学者和宪法学
者关于制宪权的对话 [The Boundary of Knowledge in Constitutional Law: A Dialogue on
Constituent Power Between a Political Theorist and a Constitutional Theorist], 3 开放时代
[OPEN TIMES] 87–103 (2010) (noting, inter alia, that “Schmitt tells us that the People
continue to exist, without organization or shape, right alongside the Constitution.”
Id. at 102 citing Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory.).
232
陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 论宪法作为国家的根本法与高级法 [On
the Constitution as Fundamental Law and Superior Law], 4 中外法学 [PEKING U. L. J.]
485–511 (2008).
233
Id.
234
Id.
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describe Schmitt’s theories as “the most systematic model of political
constitutionalism” in his 2013 work on “Political Logic in the Study of
Constitutional Theory.”235 He has said that “Carl Schmitt is the most
successful theorist who has introduced political theory into
constitutional studies,” and that Schmitt’s “personal choices” should
not detract from his academic value.236
While Chen argues that state bodies play a key role alongside
the Party, Jiang, meanwhile, is more emphatic in placing the sovereign
Decision with the Party tout court as the agent of the Chinese people’s
political will.237 Beginning in 2003, he became one of the most
prominent voices opposing “judicialization” of political matters. This
was a highly relevant intervention given the steps being taken during
that period by liberals seeking to promote Anglo-American style
judicial constitutionalism, who had a major, but ultimately isolated
victory that year when the Supreme People’s Court’s issued a projudicial constitutionalist interpretation of the law in the Qi Yuling
case.238 Jiang and others argued against the appropriateness of a judicial
body as the voice of the sovereign decision in Chinese law, paralleling
Schmitt’s views in his famous “Guardian Controversy” with Hans
Kelsen.239 Like Schmitt, these conservative scholars view the

陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 宪法学研究中的政治逻辑 [Political Logic in
the Study of Constitutional Theory], 中国宪法年刊 [CHINESE Y.B. CONST. L.], 196–99
(2013).
236
Id.
237
Jiang Shigong, Chinese-style Constitutionalism: On Backer’s Chinese Party State
Constitutionalism, 40 MODERN CHINA 2 (March 2014); 強世功 [Jiang Shigong], 违宪
审查制度的第三条道路: 中国宪制的建构与完善 [The Third Road of Constitutional
Review: The Construction and Improvement of China’s Constitutional System], 1 文化纵横
[BEIJING CULTURAL REV.] 40–9 (2016); Jiang Shigong, 中国共产党与法制建设的
关系 [The Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Construction of the Rule
of Law], 观察者 [GUANCHAZHE] (Oct. 21, 2014).
238
强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 宪法司法化的悖论: 兼论法学家在推动宪政
中的困境 [Paradoxes in the Discourse of Constitutional Adjudication: Discussed Alongside the
Predicament of Legal Scholars in Promoting Constitutional Government], 2 中国社会科学
[SOC. SCI. IN CHINA] 18–28 (2003).
See also, e.g. discussion in Veg, supra note 4.
239
Cf. Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: Growing Discord
Culminating in the ‘Guardian’ Controversy of 1931, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL
SCHMITT, 510–47 (Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons eds., 2016) (discussing the
235
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importation of a fully-empowered constitutional court as an infiltration
by an alien, liberal model of law and politics unsuited to China. 240
These debates on fundamental questions of political form and
the origins of state legitimacy have touched on a number of specific
issues regarding China’s constitutional system. For example, Jiang has
written about the importance of the “Trinity” system in which the
Party, State, and Military leadership is at all times held by the same
individual. This, he argues, is an important aspect of maintaining the
capacity for decisive authority and avoiding a situation in which the
Party’s leading role is challenged, or where it is unclear what body in
society is the ultimate voice of authority, leading to chaos and
conflict.241 Like Chen Duanhong, Jiang has also argued for emphasis
on the Constitution’s Preamble as a guide in its interpretation and
application (here both echo Dong Fanyu’s similar argument, also
explicitly based on Schmitt’s constitutional theory, in 1987), which he
argued should be accorded recognition as articulating the political basis
as the interpretation of the constitutional text.242 As the next section
will address, Chen, Jiang, and others have also applied Schmitt’s
conception of sovereignty to issues such as Beijing’s relationship with
Hong Kong, and to China’s role in international law.
The ongoing progress of developing a Party-centered political
constitutionalism along Chen and Jiang’s lines seems to be the most
concrete expression thus far of the post-1990s turn to Schmittian ideas.
The 2018 amendments to the PRC Constitution, strengthening the
position of the Executive, importing the Preamble’s “leadership of the
jurisprudential assumptions underlying the two different points of view of Schmitt
and Kelsen on the “Guardian of the Constitution.”).
240
Key issues in the debate between judicial and political constitutionalism,
in several respects echoing the Schmitt-Kelsen debate, are presented in 陈端洪
[Chen Duanhong], 林来梵 [Lin Laifan], and 高全喜[Gao Quanxi], 政治宪法学与
规范宪法学’对话’实录 [Record of the ‘Dialogue’ Between Political Constitutionalism and
Normative Constitutionalism], 2 公法研究 [PUB. L. RES.] 469–505 (2011).
241
Jiang Shigong, 民主, 如何是好 [Democracy: Which Way Is Best], 读书 [DU
SHU] (2009).
242
強世功 [Jiang Shigong], 从行政法治国到政党法治国: 党法和国法关
系的法理学思考 [From An Executive Rechtsstaat to a Party Rechtsstaat: A Jurisprudential
Analysis of the Relationship Between Party Law and State Law], 11 中国法律评论 [CHINA
L. REV.] 3, 35,41 (2016).

247

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:1

Party” directly into the first article of the constitutional text, and
creating the powerful Party-controlled National Supervision
Commission as a new tool for control over state officials, all coincide
quite comfortably with Chen and Jiang’s advocacy for a more clearly
articulated Decisionist authority in the Party (and its “core” Xi Jinping)
vis-a-vis the state.243
Aside from broad questions regarding the design and function
of the Constitution, Schmitt’s thought has also been influential in
discourse surrounding a number of more specific legal and political
topics. While his ideas have been related to many areas, including even
to topics such as environmental law,244 particularly notable are
discussions of the concepts of the “state of exception” and emergency
powers.245 On the more theoretical side, some such discussions
(specifically relating to the interpretations of Schmitt by the Italian
critical theorist Giorgio Agamben) have for instance appeared in the
influential, officially-sponsored journal Marxism and Reality.246 In such
discussions, Schmitt is less a legal or political theorist than a thinker
whose discussions of sovereignty can be used to diagnose the crisis of
values under the conditions of modernity.
However, Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism have, at times, been
adopted by scholars explicitly intending to offer the Communist Party
ideological justifications for its policies. In December 2018, the
international relations scholar Li Meng of the Beijing Foreign Studies
University published a short essay in the authoritative Party-run
243
On the content and effects of the 2018 amendments, see, e.g. Taisu Zhang
and Tom Ginsburg, Legality in Contemporary Chinese Politics, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. (2), 307390 (2019).
244
那艳华 [Na Yanhua], 环境权制度性保障研究 [Research on Institutional
Guarantee of Environmental Right], Ph.D. Dissertation, 吉林大学 [JILIN U.] (2016).
245
王奇才 [Wang Qicai], 例外状态在中国: 反思中国政治宪法学对’
例外状态’的运用 [The State of Exception in China: Reflecting on the Use of ‘The State of
Exception’ in Chinese Political Constitutionalism] (vol. no) 中国宪法年刊 [CHINESE Y.B.
CONST. L.], 113–23 (2013).
246
吴冠军 [Wu Guanjun], 生命政治:在福柯与阿甘本之间 [Biopolitics:
Between Foucault and Agamben], 马克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] (2015);
张一兵 [Zhang Yibing], 生命政治构境中的赤裸生命: 阿甘本的政治哲学话语
之一 [Bare Life in the Situating of Biopolitics: A Term in Agamben’s Political Philosophy], 马
克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] (2018).
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ideological journal Red Flag Manuscript on (Li’s interpretation of) “the
essence of Xi Jinping Thought.”247 Treating “taking the People as the
center” as the key feature distinguishing socialist from liberal political
systems, the essay refers to Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political to make
a point that could have been drawn from any number of Marxist texts:
“For the purpose of protecting individual freedom and private
property, liberalism provides a series of methods for hindering and
controlling state and government power.”248
In the broader perspective, the current trajectory of Schmitt’s
reception might be best apparent from the role of younger scholars
who have placed the German thinker’s ideas at the core of their
research agendas. Fang Xu 方旭 (b. 1984), a professor currently
affiliated with the School of Marxism Studies at the Communist Party
School of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee, is an example
of an emerging scholar who analyzes, and at times advocates Schmitt’s
ideas on a number of topics, ranging from the state of exception to
geopolitics.249
In May 2016, Fang received his Ph.D. from Chongqing
University with a thesis on “The Legal Power of Dictatorship in a
Democratic Political System: Research on the Jurisprudence of
Presidential Emergency Power as Specified in Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution.”250 His thesis advisor was the doyen of Chinese Schmittstudies, Liu Xiaofeng. In his conclusion, Fang suggests that the
247
李猛 [Li Meng], ‘以人民为中心’:习近平新时代中国特色社会主义
政治思想的精髓 [‘Taking the People as the Center’: The Essence of Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era], 红旗文稿 [RED FLAG MANUSCRIPT]
(2018).
248
Id.
249
方旭 [Fang Xu], ‘例外状态’ 的历史与法的现实意义 [The History of the
‘State of Exception’ and the Practical Significance of Law], 中国社会科学报 [CHINA SOC.
SCI. J.], (2017); 方旭 [Fang Xu], 作为政治客体的生命: 德国地缘政治学派的一
个视角 [Life as an Object of Politics: A Perspective on the German School of Geopolitics], 湖
北民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版) [JOURNAL OF HUBEI MINZU UNIVERSITY
(PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES)] 5 (2018).
250
方旭 [Fang Xu], 民主政制中的专政法权:《魏玛宪法》第48条总统
紧急权的法理学研究 [The Legal Power of Dictatorship in a Democratic Political System:
Research on the Jurisprudence of Presidential Emergency Power as Specified in Article 48 of the
Weimar Constitution], Ph.D. Dissertation, 重庆大学 [CHONGQING U.] (2016).
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experience of Weimar should lead to caution about excessive use of
emergency powers, but that, at the same time that it is necessary to
carefully study how best to use “‘dictatorship’ . . . as a ‘tool’ to preserve
the constitutional order.”251 Fang’s ability to cite and advocate
Schmitt’s concepts with the authorial affiliation of a Communist Party
organ, like Li Meng’s ability to cite him without qualifications as an
intellectual authority in Red Flag Manuscript, vividly demonstrates
Schmitt’s ongoing march into China’s academic canon.
As mentioned, yet another, newly important aspect of Schmitt
discourse has recently emerged following the 2017 Chinese translation
of The Nomos of the Earth (Da Di de Fa 大地的法).252 This has produced
an intensive engagement with this lengthy, detailed attempt by Schmitt
to unveil the “true character” of international law (and all law) as a
phenomenon based on the demarcation of space. In stark contrast to
Gao Quanxi’s one-line dismissal of this work in 2005, (and in equally
stark contrast to the 1949 Liu Shaoqi volume in which Trainin labeled
Schmitt’s international law ideas a fascist apologia for imperialism), a
new consensus seems to be building in some Chinese intellectual
circles that Schmitt’s history of international law, and his Großraum
concept, are among his most insightful and important contributions.
C. Defining China’s Political Space
Issues of territory and space have been an important theme in
recent Schmitt receptions. Scholars such as Chen Duanhong have, for
example, applied their readings of Schmitt to developing the
implications of his interpretation of sovereignty for the relationship

Id. Fang is thus not an unqualified Schmitt advocate in the sense of
viewing the latter’s theories as capable of directly generating practical applications.
Like most other Chinese Schmittians, Fang uses Schmitt’s ideas to generate diagnoses
of the flaws or paradoxes of liberalism, but this can also prompt subsequent
engagement with very different normative prescriptions, for example, those of
Western Marxists. See, e.g. 方旭 [Fang Xu], 超越‘例外状态’: 西方马克思主义者对
施米特‘主权决断论’的回应 [Overcoming the ‘State of Exception’: Western Marxists
Response to Schmitt’s ‘Sovereign Decisionism’], 贵州社会科学 [GUIZHOU SOC. SCI.] 4
(2018).
252
Schmitt, supra note 211.
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between Beijing and Hong Kong.253 These commentaries tend to be
focused on relativizing the notion of “Two Systems” to instead
emphasize, with Schmitt, that sovereignty is in essence an exceptional
authority that confers the “final say” on points of contention. While
this power can be framed by institutions and thus have its expressions
modified, it should not be understood to be “limited” by mediating
factors such as Hong Kong’s common law judiciary (in case the norms
expressed by the latter diverge from the interpretations favored by
central authorities).254
Applications of Schmitt’s thought to the special space of Hong
Kong are generally derived from his constitutional theory. However,
to the extent that authors are concerned with the notion of Hong Kong
serving as a beachhead for the intrusion of foreign political influences,
they also implicate the question of China’s regional and international
environment. This serves as a bridge to the final category of Schmitt
receptions in China today, which comprises a new and still-emerging
intellectual trend. This category consists of discussions seizing upon
Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum and related ideas as a lens through
which to view the contemporary world order and China’s place in it.
See, e.g. 陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 论香港特别行政区行政长官提名
委员会的合理性与民主正当性 [On the Legitimacy and Rationality of the Nominating
Committee for the Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive], 2014 港澳研究 [HONG KONGMACAU STUD.] 2 (2014); 陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 理解香港政治 [Understanding
Hong Kong Politics], 28 中外法学 [PEKING U. L. J.] 5 (2016); 陈端洪 [Chen
Duanhong], 论‘一国两制’条件下特别行政区国家安全概念的特殊性 [On the
Special Qualities of the Concept of National Security Under the Conditions of ‘One Country, Two
Systems’]
紫荆网
[ZIJING
NET]
(2018),
available
at:
http://hk.zijing.org/2018/0122/750657.shtml.
254
In addition to Chen, various other Schmitt-influenced scholars have
expressed such views regarding Beijing’s authority over Hong Kong. Beihang
University’s Tian Feilong 田飛龍, for example, has related this idea to Schmitt’s
notion of the “absolute constitution,” in which fundamental norms such as (in
China’s case) political unity override specific norms of a written constitutional
document such as the Basic Law. See, e.g. 田飛龍 [Tian Feilong], 施米特對魏瑪憲
制的反思及其政治宪法理论的建构 [Schmitt’s Reflections on the Weimar Constitutional
System and Their Political-Constitutionalist Structure], 南京大学法律评论 [NANJING U.
L. J.] (2014). See also JIANG SHIGONG, CHINA’S HONG KONG: A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2017) (not citing Schmitt directly but making use of
various concepts clearly associated with his work to analyze the Beijing-Hong Kong
relationship).
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Though some work along these lines was produced during earlier
stages, it has received a dramatic boost with the 2017 publication
(surprisingly late compared with his other works), of the Chinese
translation of Schmitt’s 1950 work on the history of international law,
The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum
Europaeum.
When Gao casually dismissed Schmitt’s late work in his 2004
essay, none of the latter’s Chinese readers seem to have been focused
on the idea of the Großraum. Among the reasons for this lack of
attention is certainly the lack of Chinese translations of Schmitt’s
works on this theme, as well as their politically sensitive connection
with his Nazi years and with German expansionism, as well as Japanese
claims to regional hegemony. Another reason, however, was that there
was not yet widespread interest in theorizing China’s role as a great
power in a multipolar world.
The middle years of the Hu Jintao era (2002-2012), however,
already saw a marked increase in work exploring China’s role in world
affairs and the question as to whether traditional Chinese statecraft
could provide new inspirations for diplomatic initiatives. 255 The
increased official rhetoric surrounding China’s “peaceful rise” (heping
jueqi 和平崛起) gradually prompted attempts by international relations
scholars to articulate the basis for China’s uniquely peaceful and nonhegemonic approach as a major world power. Increasingly, scholars
have sought to spell out visions for a more active and uniquely Chinese
approach to international relations, including by seeking to invent
modern analogues to traditional Chinese views on word order.256 The
See Yaqing Qin, Development of International Relations theory in China: Progress
through Debates, 11 INT’L REL. OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 231 (May 2011) (noting that
“debate [ ] on China’s peaceful rise[ ]evolved at the turn of the century[,]” and that
“[a] new round of debate seems likely to occur and may center on the question of
the world order.”).
256
See, e.g. Yan Xuetong, From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,
7 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 153, 163 (2014); YAN XUETONG, ANCIENT CHINESE
THOUGHT, MODERN CHINESE POWER (2013); on Tianxia see, e.g. Zhao Tingyang, A
Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian-xia), 56 DIOGENES 5, 5–18
(2009). Both Yan and Zhao are influential and innovative theorists of international
relations, and have spelled out their visions primarily by reference to AngloAmerican international relations theory as well as Chinese thought and history. Their
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practical impact of such discourse on policies likely remains limited,
but rhetoric surrounding harmony and China’s uniquely noncompetitive approach to foreign affairs do frequently seem to draw on
such ideas. More influential still are debates that seek to define China’s
role as simultaneously a major power and the “world’s largest
developing state.”257 Many officially-sanctioned discussions portray
China as having a special destiny due to its unique capacity to represent
the majority of the world population that lives in Third World, nonWestern, developing states.258
Beginning early in Xi Jinping’s administration, the Party’s
emphasis on developing its own new forms of internationalism had
manifested in a number of major platform announcements
(particularly the One Belt, One Road infrastructure investment
initiative) and concepts such as calling for the creation of a
“community of shared destiny for mankind” (renlei mingyun gongtongti 人
类命运共同体). Regional platforms such as the “community of
shared destiny” for Asian states, “Asian inter-civilizational dialogue,”
development of Asian security cooperation, and a “South-South
Human Rights Dialogue,” have also followed suit. New institutions
such as China’s Asian International Investment Bank and the Belt and
Road Forum add concrete order to these abstract ideas. Meanwhile,
China’s disputes over the South China Sea, as well as the ongoing
dilemma presented by Taiwan, directly present the problem of
attempting to transform China’s surrounding environment into one
consistent with the interests of the Party and the state. 259
Schmitt’s thought regarding international law has now been
taken up with growing enthusiasm by a number of scholars, despite its
late translation. China’s international situation presents the binary
views form an interesting contrast with those of the growing group of scholars
influenced by Schmitt’s international thought who are discussed in this section.
257
China Remains World’s Largest Developing Country: Experts, XINHUA (May 30,
2018).
258
See, e.g. 汪亭友 [Wang Tingyou], 新时代在世界社会主义发展中的历
史方位及其重大意义 [The Historical Role of the ‘New Era’ in the Development of World
Socialism and Its Great Importance], 红旗文稿 [RED FLAG MANUSCRIPT] 24 (2018).
259
See, e.g. Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and
Institutions: Past, Present and Futures, 27 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 945, 945–78 (2016).
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dynamic of universal and particular norms, not only in a more concrete
form than did the discussions of intellectual history that characterized
Mainland Chinese Schmitt receptions in the 1990s and early 2000s, but
also even more than the subsequent scholarship applying Schmitt’s
ideas to domestic legal issues. This is because the issue of international
norms, and the question of their scope and forms of enforcement,
directly impacts the understanding of China’s relationship with other
states and with international institutions. Schmitt’s views are highly
pertinent to such topics, especially his lengthy discussions in The Nomos
of the Earth on the origins of Western international law—which he
defined as a project of framing a common European space, regulated
by law, and an extra-European exterior without legal restraints.260
Since 2017, however, there appears to be a new trend of
macro-scale discussions aiming to place China into a Schmittinfluenced philosophy of history. Recent essays by Jiang Shigong, Fang
Xu, Wang Hui, and Liu Xiaofeng demonstrate this new turn to
Schmitt’s thought on global order and its relevance to international
policy. Jiang has notably marked a new stage in his oeuvre with a 2018
speech that was transcribed as an essay titled “Geography and Right:
Mackinder and Schmitt on the Conflict of Empires.”261 Turning away
from the discussion of domestic constitutional issues and the need for
a powerful top-down authority to represent the immanent unity of the
state, Jiang turns in this essay to a consideration of modern China in
terms of its geographical and civilizational destiny.
Towards the beginning of the essay, Jiang suggests a
connection between the domestic and international spheres. As he
writes, Western political and legal theory since Montesquieu has begun
It is relevant to note that Schmitt himself discusses the impact of AngloAmerican universalism on China in The Nomos of the Earth as well as in the Theory of
the Partisan. See, e.g. CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 191 (G.L. Ulmen trans.,
2006). For general background regarding Schmitt’s views on the process of European
legal/political expansion see id. Chapter Three.
261
强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 地理与法权: 麦金德与施米特论帝国间的冲
突 [Geography and Right: Mackinder and Schmitt on the Conflict of Empires], 爱思想 [AI
SIXIANG] (June 26, 2018). The speech was originally presented at the Peking
University forum on “Politics: China and the World 2018” and “Modern Global
Intellectual Trends and Chinese Political Tradition.”
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from the premise of a Westphalian “sovereign state,” and could not
(or did not try to) account for the political systems of the large empires
of Asia:
Montesquieu was [however] a social theorist, and thus
ultimately had to respect social reality. He noted that
the great empires of the East were connected with an
expansive geography. Because of this, he especially
emphasized the inherent connection between
geography, nature, and politics. In this sense, the basis
for the legitimacy of empires/autocracies was rooted
in geography.
It is precisely by starting from the perspective of
geography that we can cast aside the “idealist”
theoretical structure of social contract theory and
observe the concrete operation on political life of more
“materialist” forces. If we can say that the “state” is a
product of theoretical construction, then “empire” is
instead a truly existing part of real political life. 262
There follows a long discussion in which Jiang focuses on the
Schmittian theme of the essential difference between legal orders
premised on regulation of (particular) land spaces versus those seeking
to assert universality by dominating the world’s oceans. He develops
this discussion primarily through an analysis of the ideas of the British
political geographer Halford Mackinder (theorist of the “world island”
and the “heartland”)263 and, subsequently, those of Schmitt. The
opposition of land and sea, in this account, is a basic problem facing
every major state, which must determine its essential alignment either
towards maritime universalism or towards domination of a particular
continental space. Japan, Jiang argues, suffered an especially severe
case of this identity crisis at the heart of modern Asian history. It had
sought to exclude European conquerors from the Asian space, but it
was incapable of determining whether it should itself function as a
Id.
Id. For an overview of Mackinder’s ideas regarding the “world island”
and the “heartland,” see, e.g. Geoffrey Sloan, Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland
Theory Then and Now, 22 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 2–3, 15–38 (1999).
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maritime-oriented Westphalian state, after the European model, or as
an empire comprising the massive Asian heartland.264
Modern China, Jiang suggests provocatively, has also been torn
between land and sea in its attempts to exclude foreign interference
(from Japan itself, and then from the US and Soviet Union,
respectively),265 and now continues to face a choice as to its
fundamental orientation. In this and other recent writings, Jiang has
undergone a “geopolitical turn” explicitly informed by Schmitt’s
theorizations of the relationship between space and legal and political
institutions. These discussions strongly suggest that China’s fate will
be determined by its success or failure in asserting a Großraum of its
own in the Asian space that is not subject to American
interventionism.266
The Chongqing Communist Party School scholar Fang Xu also
implies similar suggestions in a July 2018 essay titled “Saying Farewell
to Universal Empire with a Großraum Order.”267 Although mostly
devoted to a detailed overview of The Nomos of the Earth and its
historical narrative, at various points the essay hints at the need for
China to assert its own agency in overcoming the “universal empire”
of Western international law. Towards the end, it presents the claim
that, as opposed to Schmitt’s projected three possible alternative world
orders, there had emerged a dialectical progression through all three.
As Fang recounts, the Cold War was followed by a period
during which America took up a position as the lone world
Jiang, supra note 261.
Id.
266
Id.; see also 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 陆地与海洋: ‘空间革命’与世界历
史的‘麦金德时代’ [Land and Sea: ‘Spatial Revolution’ and the ‘Mackinder Age’ of World
History], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 6 (2018); 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 陆地,海洋与
文明秩序 [Land, Sea, and Civilizational Order], 读书 [DU SHU] (2019); 强世功 [Jiang
Shigong], 地缘政治战略与世界帝国的兴衰: 从‘壮年麦金德’到‘老年麦金德’
[Geopolitical Strategy and the Rise and Fall of World Empires: From ‘Mackinder in His Prime’
to ‘Late Mackinder’], 2 中国政治学 [CHINESE POLITOLOGY] 110 (2018) (discussing
Schmitt’s views on the expansion of European law and political power in Chapter 3
of The Nomos of the Earth).
267
方旭 [Fang Xu], 以大空间秩序告别普世帝国 [Saying Farewell to
Universal Empire with a Großraum Order], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 4 (2018).
264
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superpower. Soon after, though, the US had belied its claims to
legitimate universal rule with its response to the 9/11 attacks—a
unilateral attempt to play the role of “global policeman” while failing
to actually establish global consensus on actions such as the Iraq War.
Meanwhile, its encroachments into other nations’ spaces, Fang claims,
had led many to see the need for a Großraum order of self-sufficient
regions able to exclude American interventionism. With his late
speculations on the possibility of a “New Nomos of the Earth,” Schmitt
had “handed over a golden needle in the dark” (an du jinzhen 暗度金
针), an expression for passing on secret knowledge and techniques. 268
Wang Hui, too, has begun to supplement his world-historical
reflections with spatial themes drawn from Nomos. This is apparent in
a 2018 two-part essay entitled “20th Century China as an Object of
Thought.”269 The second part, which carries the subtitle, “Spatial
Revolution, Parallax Time and Displaced Politics,”270 begins with a
reference to Marx’s “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” and its famous
opening line regarding repetitions of historical phenomena. Wang
suggests that Marx’s philosophy of history, while providing insights, is
still reliant on an essentially homogeneous model of time and space
that does not reflect the very different historical experiences of
different cultures. By contrast, Schmitt’s idea of a world history defined
by the contest of different ways of ordering space, and in which the
rise of Europe took place as part of a “spatial revolution” of maritimeoriented states laying claim to the non-Western world, could be a
fruitful basis for theorizing China’s unique modern fate.
As Wang writes, “[f]rom the 17th century, the Qing began to
have dealings with the ‘two different kinds of hunter’ that Schmitt
claims radically expanded [the European] space (i.e. the Russian fur
trappers and the Western and Northern European pirates).” In doing
so, the Qing began assimilating to the formal characteristics of modern
Id.
汪晖 [Wang Hui], 作为思想对象的二十世纪中国: 薄弱环节的革命
与二十世纪的诞生 [20th Century China as an Object of Thought: The Weak Link of
Revolution and the Dawn of the 20th Century], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 5 (2018).
270
汪晖 [Wang Hui], 作为思想对象的二十世纪中国: 空间革命, 横向时
间与置换的政治 [20th Century China as an Object of Thought: Spatial Revolution, Parallax
Time and Displaced Politics], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 6 (2018).
268
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statehood, for instance via the Treaty of Nerchinsk, by which the Qing
delimited exact geographical boundaries with the Russian Empire on
the basis of territorial sovereign equality. Schmitt’s philosophy of
international legal history based on land appropriation can afford
useful reflections to China as it questions what makes it distinct from
the Western state system in which it finds itself: “the so-called
geographical perspective is not just a matter of geography, behind it
lies the issue of how to determine the spatial boundaries and inner
content of ‘China.’”271
A few months after the appearance of the Chinese version of
The Nomos of the Earth, Liu Xiaofeng published an essay titled
“European Civilization’s ‘Free Space’ and Modern China: A Reading
of Carl Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde.”272 In it, he takes Schmitt’s Nomos
as a model for what “global history” should mean in the context of
Chinese Marxism.
In Schmittian terms, as China continues to grow, the
US has every reason to be worried. The relationship
between the US Mainland and the newly-emerging
space of East Asia precisely resembles how Old
Europe was squeezed out of the [Western]
Hemisphere by the world-historic rise of America. Just
so will America be squeezed out of Asia due to the
world-historic rise of China: Currently this is
happening with respect to [China’s] challenges to USdelineated “free space.”
China’s world-historical rise is connected with the
Eastern tradition of Marxism (Makesizhuyi de dong chuan
马克思主义的东传). This has meant that Marxism

Id.
刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 欧洲文明的‘自由空间’与现代中国: 读施米
特《大地的法》劄记 [European Civilization’s ‘Free Space’ and Modern China: A Reading
of Carl Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde], 2 中国政治学 [CHINESE POLITOLOGY] 21-64
(2018).
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brought about a kind of new “Nomos of the Earth”
(yizhong xin de Da Di Fa 一种新的大地法).273
As was the case with Jiang and Xu’s world-historical
reflections, Liu does not specifically spell out the particular means by
which China should deliver upon this promise of a new order, aside
from seeking to end American hegemony in Asia and to consolidate
its own “great space.” However, he is more concrete in spelling out his
view that the character of a Chinese-defined Großraum should draw
(syncretic) inspiration from traditional Chinese culture, Hegelian and
Marxist philosophy, and the political experience of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Schmitt was not a Marxist. It was only because he
respected historical reality that he emphasized how the
Hegelian - Marxian new Nomos of the Earth sought to
overcome the Anglo-Saxon and Americanist (Angelu –
Sakexun he Meilijianzhuyi 盎格鲁 – 撒克逊和美利坚
主义) Nomos of the Earth.
Hegel saw that Kantian cosmopolitanism had ignored
Aristotle’s emphasis on ethical cultivation, moral
education, the development of good mores, and the
socialization manifested via the ethical order
(Sittlichkeit) of various cultures and histories. In a word,
Kant was indifferent to the ethical meaning or ethical
value of historical and social orders.
As far as we are concerned, the unavoidable politicalhistorical question is: if China relies upon [its own] kind
of “-ism” as it rises, it will inevitably bring the world
into a new Nomos of the Earth. Moreover, that means
that the traditional virtues of Chinese civilization must
engage in a struggle with the Anglo-Saxon and
Americanist Nomos of the Earth. In fact, already in
1946, Mao Zedong “intellectually broke through the
restraints of the postwar Great Powers, establishing an

273

Id. at 63–4.
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independent and autonomous policy towards America
and no longer placing the Soviet Union’s attitudes and
interests in the place of importance.”
What, then, exactly is the nature of the new Nomos of
the Earth? That was given its response in Schmitt’s
1963 book The Theory of the Partisan.274
Liu’s views here go rather beyond both official policy and
mainstream intellectual discourse, even among his fellow Schmitt
readers. Nonetheless, he articulates a clear set of practical takeaways
for China from the philosophy of history contained in Nomos. First,
like Jiang, Xu, and others, Liu argues that American efforts to police
the space of Asia and to enforce “international norms” are in fact
efforts at maintaining a universal global hegemony. Second, he views
China’s destiny as consisting in overcoming this hegemony by
becoming the determiner of norms within its own space. Lastly, he
views the Chinese Communist Party as the embodiment of the various
different influences—traditional Chinese culture, Hegelian–Marxian
thought, and modern Asian political experience—that provide the
Asian space with an essentially different social and historical character
from that of the Anglo-American world.
Even if mainstream scholarship or policy does not follow the
path of explicitly advocating a China-based Asian Großraum of the sort
that the above essays imply, Schmitt’s thought on these issues has
perhaps begun to influence more concrete discussions of Mainland
China’s nearby spaces, such as those on the law of the sea as well as
the management of Hong Kong issues. Some works have now cited
Schmitt’s Nomos and his Großraum theory as playing a role in theorizing
“a new approach to the sea,”275 by which China can strategically engage
with existing maritime rules where these are favorable, and propose its
own alternative forms of order when existing rules work against its
interests.276 Given the profound geopolitical tensions associated with
Id. at 64.
陆炎 [Lu Yan], 中国走向海洋的另一种思维 [Another Conceptualization
of China’s March Towards the Sea], 中国图书评论 [CHINA BOOK REV.] 7 (2014).
276
See, e.g. 郑志华 [Zheng Zhihua] and 郑溶 [Zheng Rong], 卡尔·施米
特海洋秩序观初探 [Initial Research regarding Carl Schmitt’s Perspective on Maritime
274
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freedom of navigation and security issues in the South China Sea and
other nearby waters, this seems likely to be an area in which Schmitt’s
thought will continue to exert a growing influence. Indicating the
likelihood of further such developments, in March 2019, the key
Communist Party ideological journal Seeking Truth published two
pieces (including one by the emerging Schmitt scholar with an interest
in the Großraum, Fang Xu) in which Schmitt’s thought is tied to the
problem of defining a critique of “empire” in international political
economy.277
Overall, the Großraum is perhaps the main Schmittian concept
that has yet to fully make its mark on legal and political debates. For a
Party that has lost much of its firm commitment to doctrinaire Marxist
political economy, the subsequent embrace of a “sound economy in a
strong state,” or a de facto authoritarian developmentalist system, has
kept its appeal since the 1980s. If the economic-developmentalist
justification of Party rule ever seems to be seriously in doubt, however,
Order], 云南大学学报 (法学版) [J.YUNNAN U. (L. ED.)] 4 (2012) (recounting
Schmitt’s discussions of the opposition between Land and Sea, and the different
“universal” character of maritime rules as lacking the centralized character of
territorial sovereignty, but at the same time noting that China’s maritime commerce
has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the existing order); see also 黄一玲
[Huang Yiling], 共建公正合理的海洋新秩序 [Collectively Constructing a Just and
Rational New Maritime Order], 1 复旦国际关系评论 [FUDAN INT’L STUD. REV.] 298–
311 (2018) (citing Zhang and Zheng, supra this note, and noting that the differences
between the legal regimes for land and sea lie in part because the resources of the
latter have not been fully “divided up”; meanwhile, suggesting on this basis that
China needs to establish amenable rules for its “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”
policies.).
277
蓝江 [Lan Jiang] and 王欢 [Wang Huan], 从帝国到数字帝国主义: 重
读哈特和奈格里的《帝国》[From Empire to Digital Imperialism: Rereading Hardt and
Negri’s Empire], 2019 求是学刊 [SEEKING TRUTH] 2 (2019); 方旭 [Fang Xu], ‘例外’
之幕下的新帝国:《帝国:全球化的政治秩序》新读 [The New Empire Under the
Curtain of the ‘Exception’: Rereading Empire: The Political Order of Globalization], 2019 求
是学刊 [SEEKING TRUTH] 2 (2019). Jiang Shigong has also published another similar
essay in which he dwells on these themes, again drawing clearly on the Nomos of the
Earth, to make the point that international law up to the present day has been shaped
by a “Western Christian Civilization” that used it to establish a “universal empire,”
in which China and other non-Western civilizations must now seek to define their
role and capacity for action. 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 超大型政治实体的内在逻辑
: ‘帝国’ 与世界秩序 [The Intrinsic Logic of Very Large Political Entities: ‘Empire’ and
World Order], 2019 文化纵横 [WENHUA ZONGHENG] 2 (2019).
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the spatial logic of the Großraum—i.e. the right to defend a pluralistic
world order of multiple civilizational centers without intrusions by
Western states seeking to enforce liberal norms—may provide an
alternative theory of legitimation. Indeed many of China’s current
internationally-focused polices, such as the Belt and Road Initiative,
could derive support from either of these two legitimation strategies.278
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a considerable diversity in Chinese intellectuals’
engagements with Carl Schmitt, but these have nonetheless shared
some dominant themes ever since the encounters of the 1920s–1930s.
Then as now, concepts such as the “Decision” that defines the
character of a political community, or the concrete order of its form
of life that produces Friend-Enemy dynamics, offer a conceptual
vocabulary untethered to either Anglo-American liberalism or to
orthodox Marxism. The search for a “third way” and for a Chinese
Sonderweg under the alienating conditions of modernity and global
capitalism has prompted many to engage with Schmitt’s ideas, albeit
with very different conclusions.
Since the Nanjing Decade, some have found in Schmitt’s ideas
of Executive power defending a concrete order of social and legal
institutions the justification for projects of “authoritarian liberalism,”
wedding a powerful semi-dictatorial state to a relatively free economy.
These readings, reappearing in the 1980s and 1990s, played a role in
the different processes of liberalization that unfolded in Taiwan and
then in Mainland China, in the former case broadening into an
embrace of multiparty democracy while in the latter retaining
authoritarian Party rule. Given the inability of classic Marxist thought
to describe Chinese state-led development policies in the post-1979
Reform Era, Schmitt’s depiction of a “qualitative” strong state that
refrains from undue economic intervention, but exercises dictatorial
powers as to political matters, remains highly relevant. The course that
China has taken during Wang Huning’s rise to theoretical prominence
See, e.g. 中国以‘人类命运共同体’破解‘文明冲突,’ [China Breaks
Through ‘the Conflict of Civilizations’ by Means of ‘the Community of Shared Future for
Mankind’], CHINA DAILY (Dec. 28, 2018).
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has often echoed this model originally articulated in the vein of Weimar
era conservatism, and this likely explains much of the ongoing
appeal—and verisimilitude—of Schmitt’s thought to Chinese
intellectuals. Even for those advocating democratic or constitutional
reforms, Schmitt’s thought can be a useful point of departure precisely
because of the considerable overlap between his premises and those of
the ruling authorities in an era of economic, but not political,
liberalization.
Meanwhile, there have also been those who have cited Schmitt
in the service of more radical visions of a China-centered “great space,”
excluding incursions by alien powers. In the 1930s, for example, Yao
Baoxian disseminated Schmitt’s theory in the name of a more farreaching system of one-party rule and dictatorship by Chiang Kai-shek,
while also pursuing a quixotic pan-Asian and Buddhist revivalist theopolitics. Later, Schmitt’s writings on geopolitical space were made use
of by collaborators with the Japanese occupation regime. Though these
associations were long forgotten, it is striking that Schmitt’s theories
of spatial revolution and international legal history have been the last
of his writings to be translated into Chinese. They have only recently
begun to be read widely and with great interest vis-à-vis current
geopolitical tensions and questions about China’s role in world order.
In general, Schmitt’s status as a source of critical perspectives
on liberal constitutional democracy is by now quite firmly established
in Chinese intellectual discourse. It is less certain, however, whether
his thought will help to build any new special path for Chinese political
modernity, or any lasting domestic or international legal structures.

263

